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Abstract
Models of the antecedents of pathological gambling (PG) include the processes 
of classical and instrumental conditioning. After experiences with gambling, appetitive 
classical conditioning can lead to a learned relation between the gambling environment 
and excitement, and this excitement can subsequently become a conditioned positive 
reinforcer for continued gambling behaviour. The gambling environment can also 
become associated with negative feelings through the process of aversive conditioning, 
and these negative feelings can serve as conditioned punishment, ultimately leading to 
the avoidance of gambling. Gambling involves both positive reinforcement and 
punishment, and operates on a variable interval reinforcement schedule that makes 
gambling behaviour difficult to extinguish. Differences in the degree to which 
individuals acquire classical conditioning (conditionability), and differences in the 
degree to which individuals approach and respond to instrumental conditioning 
(reinforcement sensitivity) are understudied in relation to gambling behaviour. The 
studies reported in this thesis further investigated conditionability and reinforcement 
sensitivity in relation to gambling behaviour. The first aim was to investigate whether 
individual differences in differential aversive classical conditioning and reinforcement 
sensitivity were associated with risk-avoidance on a gambling task. The second aim 
was to also to include appetitive conditioning in order to investigate if aversive 
conditioning, appetitive conditioning and reinforcement sensitivity could explain 
differences in risk-taking during gambling. The third aim was to investigate whether 
PGs would show diminished conditionability by comparing them with a control group. 
Three studies were conducted in order to achieve these aims. The first study employed 
a differential aversive conditioning paradigm with skin conductance as the outcome 
measure. The results showed that a group of student participants did not show aversive 
conditioning, and furthermore that this group showed less risk-avoidance when 
gambling on the Iowa gambling task. No association was found between reinforcement 
sensitivity and risk-avoidance, therefore it seemed that aversive conditioning alone 
could contribute to explaining variation in risk-avoidance. The second study employed 
an evaluative conditioning paradigm where both appetitive and aversive evaluative 
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conditioning was measured. The results showed that the student participants who did 
not show appetitive nor aversive conditioning showed less risk-taking on a purpose 
built simulated slot machine designed to be more similar to commercially available 
gambling products than the Iowa gambling task. Furthermore, the student participants 
who had low scores on both self-reported reward responsiveness and punishment 
sensitivity (i.e. fight-flight-freeze system) also showed less risk-taking when gambling. 
In the third study, a group of PGs were compared to a control group on a differential 
aversive classical conditioning paradigm where heart rate responses comprised the 
outcome variable. The results showed that the PG group showed diminished aversive 
conditioning compared to the control group. These results combined suggest that the 
effects of the processes of classical and instrumental conditioning for gambling 
behaviour are contingent on individuals’ conditionability and reinforcement 
sensitivity.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Definitions, Prevalence and Co-morbidity 
1.1.1 Definitions 
The dictionary definition of the verb to gamble is “to do something risky that 
might result in loss of money or failure, hoping to get money or achieve success” 
(Gamble, n.d.). To take risks in the hope that it might benefit oneself or one’s kin is a 
fundamental characteristic of human beings. As with most human characteristics, there 
are individual differences in risk taking that may have evolutionary roots. In times of 
strife, risk-taking may be beneficial, hence individual differences in risk-taking may be 
inherited through generations so that it is found to varying degrees in modern life 
(Buss, 2009). However, such risk-taking may not be adaptive in present day peaceful 
societies, as preference for potentially dangerous risk-taking may result in behaviours 
such as extreme sports, driving too fast, and excessive gambling. 
As with other forms of appetitive behaviour, the distribution of gambling 
frequency in a population falls on a continuum which is positively skewed, implying 
that as gambling frequency increases, the number of people decreases (Lund & 
Nordlund, 2003; Orford, 2011). Individuals in the high end of the distribution may 
develop gambling problems, and be in need of treatment. Although several terms have 
been proposed in the literature to describe problems that arise from gambling, two are 
most prominent. The first is the term “pathological gambling” (PG). The second term 
is “problem gambling”. Although these two terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably, they are theoretically distinct. The present Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual for Mental Disorders, uses the term PG, and defines it as “persistent and 
recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts personal, family, or vocational 
pursuits”(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 671) . The diagnostic criteria for 
PG are as follows (p. 674):  
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A. Persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior as indicated by five 
(or more) of the following:  
1. Is preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past 
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, or 
thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble) 
2. Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve 
the desired excitement 
3. Has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling 
4. Is restless when attempting  to cut down or stop gambling 
5. Gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric 
mood (e.g. feelings of helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression) 
6. After losing money on gambling, often returns another day to get even 
(“chasing” one’s losses) 
7. Lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of 
involvement with gambling 
8. Has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or embezzlement 
to finance gambling 
9. Has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or 
career opportunity because of gambling  
10. Relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial 
situation caused by gambling 
B. The gambling behavior is not better accounted for by a Manic Episode. 
 
In the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), PG is classified as 
an “impulse control disorder not otherwise specified”, along with intermittent 
explosive disorder, kleptomania, pyromania, and trichotillomania. PG first appeared in 
the third edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  In the 
revision of the third edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1987), the diagnostic 
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criteria for PG were based on the diagnostic criteria for substance dependence, and 
general addictive tendencies were assumed to be the underlying explanatory model for 
PG (Walker, 1992). It has been argued that PG is only classified as an impulse control 
disorder because the DSM does not have a separate section on addictions (Shaffer, 
2003). Indeed, a large and growing amount of evidence indicates that PG shows 
commonalities with substance abuse, suggesting that PG should be classified as a 
behavioural addiction rather than an impulse control disorder (J. E. Grant, Brewer, & 
Potenza, 2006). The PG diagnosis includes concepts that are at the core of addiction; 
preoccupation, tolerance, withdrawal, and loss of control. It is, therefore, assumed that 
gamblers can become addicted and be diagnosed by the use of criteria that are similar 
to other addictions. Thus, the theoretical concept that PG is based on has been referred 
to as “the addiction-based concept of problem gambling” (Svetieva & Walker, 2008).   
In contrast, the term “problem gambling” has been referred to as lying within 
“the problem centred concept of problem gambling” (Svetieva & Walker, 2008). 
“Problem gambling” has been defined as “the situation where a person’s gambling 
activity gives rise to harm to the individual player, and/or his or her family, and may 
extend into the community” (Dickerson, McMillen, Hallenbone, Volberg, & Wooley, 
1997, p. 106). In using the term, gambling is viewed on a continuum ranging from 
non-problematic gambling to over-involvement that leads to gambling problems. 
Gambling is viewed as an activity that is distributed on a continuum also seen in other 
appetitive behaviour, such as alcohol consumption. The curve shows that the majority 
of people conform to moderate use, whilst the number of people declines as use 
becomes more excessive (Orford, 2001a). As such, it places little emphasis on why 
some individuals gamble excessively. “Problem gambling” is rather a result of 
excessive gambling, and therefore it is theoretically neutral. Orford (2001b) uses the 
term “excessive gambling” to describe involvement in and appetite for gambling that 
conflicts with attempts to restrain gambling. He argues that:  
Addiction should be defined in terms of the strength of a person’s attachment to 
the activity as indicated by such criteria as: frequency, regularity and quantity; 
preoccupation with and priority given to the activity; the subjective feeling of 
being dependent or addicted; financial, social and legal harm caused by the 
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activity; and difficulty in reducing or giving up despite activity-related harm. 
(Orford, 2001b, p. 46).  
In contrast to the term PG, the term “problem gambling” does not necessarily imply 
that a person is addicted to gambling. The focus is on the severity of harm suffered by 
the individual, and not on the mechanisms underlying why some individuals move 
from gambling moderately to gambling excessively (Svetieva & Walker, 2008). 
Therefore, the term “problem gambling” has gained popularity as it fits well within a 
public health model. “Problem gambling” is not only viewed as an addiction that 
affects individuals, but as taking place in a social context where the negative effects 
also concern communities (Korn, Gibbins, & Azmier, 2003). 
Perhaps confusingly, the term “problem gambling” is sometimes referred to as a 
less severe form of PG. This is reflected in the use of measurement instruments such 
as the South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur & Blume, 1993) and the Canadian 
Problem Gambling Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). In several studies, the cut-off point 
for “problem gambling” is to fulfil 3 or 4 of the DSM criteria, and is synonymous 
with “at risk” gamblers. It is important to bear in mind that such use of the term may 
ignore the differing theoretical underpinnings of “problem gambling” and PG. 
 In this thesis, the term PG is used because its aim is to add to the research 
literature that attempts to describe the mechanisms that predisposes some individuals 
to develop gambling problems. Its focus is therefore on individual mental health 
rather than on public health. By using the term PG, it is not my intention to argue that 
PGs are qualitatively distinct types of people, but it is rather an acknowledgment that 
they are individuals who are unfortunate enough to gamble so excessively that they 
may be in need of intervention, treatment or otherwise, to increase the quality of their 
lives. 
1.1.2 Prevalence of PG 
Prevalence estimates of gambling problems in communities are strongly 
influenced by definitions and measurement instruments. As already discussed, there 
are several different definitions. There are also over a dozen instruments that have 
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been proposed for measuring problem gambling and PG (Stinchfield, Govoni, & 
Frisch, 2007). Three of these are most widely used in prevalence studies. The first and 
most commonly used is the South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur & Blume, 1987) 
and the South Oaks Gambling Screen – Revised (Lesieur & Blume, 1993). This 
instrument was originally designed to measure PG as defined in the DSM-III-R 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987) in treatment-seeking populations. It 
comprises 20 statements where respondents indicate “yes” or “no” to each statement. 
A score of 3 or 4 is often defined as “problem gambling”, and a score of 5 or above is 
the cut-off point for “probable pathological gambling”. A recent overview of 
prevalence rates of problem gambling and PG for adults (> 15 years of age) across all 
countries where prevalence rates were available showed that the weighted mean using 
the SOGS was 1.2% for problem gambling (Stucki & Rihs-Middel, 2007), ranging 
from 0.4 % in Norway (Lund & Nordlund, 2003) to 3.6% in the USA (Welte, Barnes, 
Wieczorek, Tidwell, & Parker, 2001). The weighted mean for PG was 1.8%, ranging 
from 0.2% in Norway (Lund & Nordlund, 2003) to 3.5% in Nevada, USA (Volberg, 
2002). 
A second widely used instrument for measuring problem gambling and PG is the 
Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI) (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). Within this 
framework, problem gambling is defined as  “…gambling behaviour that creates 
negative consequences for the gambler, others in his or her social network, or for the 
community" (Ferris & Wynne, 2001, Introduction at 1.2). The CPGI contains nine 
items that are scored to comprise an index with several categories into which 
respondents may be placed; non-gamblers, non-problem gamblers, low-risk gamblers, 
moderate-risk gamblers, and problem gamblers. However, a scoring that is commonly 
used is one where 3 to 7 confirmed items comprises a problem gambling category (or 
moderate gambling), and 8 or 9 confirmed items comprises a PG category (or severe 
problem gambling). Stucki and Rihs-Middel’s  (2007) overview showed that the 
weighted mean prevalence rate using the CPGI was 2.4% for problem gambling, 
ranging from 1.0% in Québec, Canada (Ladouceur et al., 2004) to 4.7% in 
Saskatchewan, Canada (Wynne, 2002). The weighted mean prevalence rate for PG 
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was 0.8%, ranging from 0.5% in Canada as a whole (Marshall & Wynne, 2003) to 
1.4% in New Brunswick, Canada (Focal Research Consultants, 2001). 
In addition to the SOGS and the CPGI, some prevalence studies use the DSM 
definition and the DSM-IV criteria. As with the diagnosis of PG, individuals who 
indicate agreement with 5 or more criteria are categorised as PG. In addition, 
individuals who indicate agreement with 3 or 4 criteria are sometimes referred to as 
problem gamblers. In Stucki and Rihs-Middel’s  (2007) overview, the weighted mean 
prevalence rate for problem gambling using the DSM-IV criteria was 1.9%. 
Prevalence rates ranged from 0.45% in Norway (Götestam & Johansson, 2003) to 
4.0% in Hong Kong, China (Wong & So, 2003). For PG, the weighted mean 
prevalence was 1.2%, ranging from 0.15% in Norway (Götestam & Johansson, 2003) 
to 2.1% in Singapore (Ministry of Community Development YaS, 2005). 
1.1.3 Comorbid Disorders 
PG is associated with several comorbid disorders, and more often than not PG is 
only one among several disorders that an individual may suffer from. In the largest 
study of comorbidity of PG to date, more than 43,000 people in the United States were 
interviewed (Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2005) using NIAAA Alcohol Use Disorder and 
Associated Disabilities Interview Schedule-DSM-IV (B. F. Grant, Dawson, & Hasin, 
2001). After adjusting for sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the 
results showed that alcohol use disorder, drug use disorder and nicotine dependence 
were more prevalent among PGs compared to the rest of the sample (6.0, 4.4 and 6.7 
times more likely to occur respectively). In addition, PGs were 4.4 times more likely 
to have a comorbid mood disorder, 3.9 times more likely to have a comorbid anxiety 
disorder and 8.3 times more likely to have a comorbid personality disorder.  
These findings were replicated in a later large US survey (Kessler et al., 2008). 
This survey also reported that PGs showed strong “multimorbidity”. PGs were 10.1 
times more likely to report one disorder in addition to PG, 9.1 times more likely to 
report two additional disorders, and 30 times more likely to report three or more 
disorders. In addition, the results from the survey attempted to answer the question of 
which came first of PG and the comorbid disorders using age-of-onset analysis. The 
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findings suggested that the comorbid disorders predated the onset of PG, however as 
these findings were based on self-reported age of onset, using a cross-sectional design, 
care should be taken in interpreting these results.    
Based on these findings, it is important to view PG as a disorder typically 
involving other disorders. The antecedents of PG may not be unique for PG, but may 
also be antecedents for developing other addictions as well as other psychological 
disorders. 
1.2 Antecedents of PG 
The antecedents of PG involve a complex interplay between individual and 
contextual factors. Here, the focus is in individual factors, therefore the contextual 
factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of PG are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it can be mentioned briefly that among the contextual 
factors that are suggested to be important for the development of PG are increased 
availability and accessibility of gambling (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Productivity 
Commision, 1999), exposure to gambling and repeated interaction with gambling 
games (Shaffer et al., 2004), and contact with gambling sub-cultures (Sharpe, 2002). 
In addition, structural properties of gambling games that make them more addictive 
may also be important (Griffiths, 1993; Parke & Griffiths, 2006). In this section, three 
individual factors are discussed that have been suggested as important for the 
development and maintenance of PG; learning mechanisms, cognitive distortions, and 
personality (e.g. Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Shaffer, et al., 2004; Sharpe, 2002). 
1.2.1 Learning Mechanisms: Classical and Instrumental 
Conditioning
Classical Conditioning 
Classical conditioning is a form of learning that was discovered by Ivan Pavlov 
through his work on the digestive system in dogs (Pavlov, 1927). It involves two 
different kinds of stimuli. The first is a “weak” stimulus that by itself does not cause a 
physiological response apart from an orienting response, and it is commonly called a 
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conditioned stimulus (CS). Examples of CS are the sound of a metronome, a 
photograph of a neutral face, or a small dot presented on a computer screen. The 
second form is a “strong” stimulus that does cause a physiological response, such as 
the presentation of food, which causes a salvatory response, or a puff of air to the eye, 
which causes an eye-blink response (Hugdahl, 1995). Such a stimulus is commonly 
referred to as an unconditioned stimulus (US). The US can be appetitive or aversive. In 
classical conditioning, the CS is paired with the US, and the result is that the CS comes 
to elicit a conditioned response (CR) that can be similar to the physiological response 
elicited by the US (Pavlov, 1927). An example of classical conditioning is differential 
conditioning. Here, two different CSs (e.g. two tones with different pitch) are used that 
are presented in random order, one is the CS+ and the other is the CS-. Only 
presentation of the CS+ is followed by the US (e.g. a loud burst of noise). After 
repeated presentation, the CS+ comes to yield a CR (e.g. increased electrodermal 
activity or increased heart rate), but the CS- does not (Hugdahl, 1995). Through this 
differential conditioning paradigm, the CS+ has come to provide information about the 
US, and predict the occurrence of the US (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). A related form 
of conditioning is evaluative conditioning (EC). EC typically involves the presentation 
of a picture CS that is evaluated using self-report before and after it has been 
repeatedly presented together with a positive or negative US (e.g. a shocking picture). 
The change in evaluation that often occurs in such a paradigm is evidence of EC 
(Levey & Martin, 1987).  
Neurobiological research has implicated the amygdala in the acquisition of 
classical conditioning (Fendt & Faselow, 1999). For example one study showed that 
disabling amygdala functioning blocked the acquisition of classical conditioning 
(Campeau, Miserendino, & Davis, 1992). The hippocampus, the anterior cingulated 
cortex, the insula and the medial temporal lobe have also been implicated in classical 
conditioning (LeDoux, 1996; Sehlmeyer et al., 2009). Appetitive and aversive 
conditioning seem to have different neurological basis. Appetitive conditioning has 
been shown to evoke neural responses in the medial orbitofrontal cortex, whilst 
aversive conditioning has been shown to evoke neural responses in the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex (Gottfried, O'Doherty, & Doland, 2002).  
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Classical conditioning is viewed as an important process in the development of 
gambling behaviour (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Orford, 2001a; Sharpe & Tarrier, 
1993). It has been observed that gambling leads to increased arousal, and this has been 
interpreted as reflecting the subjective feeling of excitement during gambling 
(Anderson & Brown, 1984; Dickerson, 1972). This excitement can act as an appetitive 
US. The initially emotionally irrelevant gambling environment can be viewed as a CS. 
As in Pavlov’s experiments, pairing the gambling environment with the experience of 
excitement caused by winning can lead to classical conditioning, and the gambling 
environment can come to predict the occurrence of excitement. Alternatively, the 
negative emotions caused by having lost money can become an aversive US. Pairing 
the gambling environment with such negative emotions can lead to a learned relation 
between the gambling environment and negative emotions, and the gambling 
environment comes to predict the occurrence of negative emotion. Thus, if gambling 
becomes associated with excitement, an increase in gambling can be predicted. 
Conversely, if gambling becomes associated with negative emotion, a decrease in or 
avoidance of gambling can be predicted. 
Instrumental Conditioning 
Instrumental conditioning is another basic form of learning that was studied by 
pioneers such as Thorndike (1911) and Skinner (1938). It is different from classical 
conditioning in that the animal or person makes a behavioural response and thereby 
produces an outcome. In a classic example, a hungry rat is placed in a small box that is 
bare apart from a lever on one of the walls and tray where food pellets can be 
delivered. Such a box is often referred to as a “Skinner box”. Pressing the lever results 
in the delivery of a food pellet into the tray. In instrumental conditioning, the food 
pellet is called a positive reinforcer. The lever pressing is called an operant response. 
Initially, the rat will accidentally press the lever, but because this results in the delivery 
of a food pellet, lever pressing behaviour increases. Therefore, through this 
instrumental conditioning, the rat has learned to press the lever.  
There are several forms of reinforcement (Domjan, 2003). As in the above 
example, behaviour is positively reinforced because the response produces an 
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appetitive stimulus. Therefore, the behavioural response is likely to increase in 
frequency. Punishment is another form of reinforcement. If the behavioural response 
produces punishment (such as an electric shock), the behavioural response is likely to 
decrease in frequency. Extinction of instrumental conditioning is expected if the 
reinforcement stops. However, how long it takes to extinguish instrumental 
conditioning depends on the schedule of reinforcement. There are several 
reinforcement schedules that determine the frequency of reinforcement (Domjan, 
2003). In the above example, the positive reinforcement is presented every time after 
the behavioural response, and is referred to as continuous reinforcement. Another 
schedule of reinforcement is referred to as a variable ratio schedule. Here, 
reinforcement only takes place after some of the behavioural responses, and the ratio 
of behavioural responses to reinforcement is variable. It has been suggested that 
variable ratio schedules of reinforcement produce instrumental conditioning that takes 
longer to extinguish (Skinner, 1953). 
Stimuli such as food pellets and electric shocks are called primary reinforcers 
because they satisfy basic drives. However, not all reinforcers are primary reinforcers. 
Almost any stimulus can become a reinforcer through classical conditioning (Wolfe, 
1936). For example, if a Skinner box includes a light that flashes when food is 
presented (the primary reinforcer), the flashing light can become a conditioned 
reinforcer because it becomes associated with the primary reinforcer. Such conditioned 
reinforcers may also be more powerful compared to primary reinforcers (Wolfe, 
1936). An obvious example of a conditioned reinforcer is money.  
In relation to gambling, placing a wager can be viewed as the behavioural 
response, and winning money can be viewed as positive reinforcement. Therefore, 
winning during gambling can lead to increasing the frequency of gambling. Losing 
money can also be viewed as punishment, which can lead to a decrease in the 
frequency of gambling. Positive reinforcement during gambling occurs on a variable 
ratio schedule, as it is difficult to determine when the next win is going to take place. 
This variable ratio reinforcement may lead to longer periods of gambling once at the 
gambling venue (Dickerson, 1972). Variable ratio schedules of reinforcement may also 
help explain why gamblers continue to gamble despite losing, as such schedules 
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produce instrumental conditioning that may take a long time to extinguish (Skinner, 
1953). In addition, after a classically conditioned association between gambling and 
excitement has been learned, excitement can be a conditioned positive reinforcer for 
continued gambling behaviour (Anderson & Brown, 1984). It could be the case that 
the excitement a gambler experiences (e.g. whilst the roulette wheel is spinning or the 
horses are racing) are as powerful a reinforcer for continued gambling as the 
excitement associated with winning money (Dickerson, 1972). However, this is 
contingent on the association between gambling behaviour and winning, which is 
learned through classical conditioning. Gambling behaviour might instead be 
associated with negative emotions if gambling results in losing. In this case, the 
negative emotions experienced in anticipation of a gambling outcome may serve as 
conditioned punishment, which in turn may lead to a decrease in gambling behaviour. 
1.2.2 Cognitive Distortions 
Cognitive distortions are regarded as important in the development and 
maintenance of PG (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Sharpe, 2002; Sharpe & Tarrier, 
1993; Toneatto, 1999). The thoughts and beliefs gamblers hold about gambling are 
regarded as important in explaining why some gamblers have difficulties controlling 
their gambling behaviour. Several cognitive distortions have been described in the 
literature. A useful framework for categorisation has been proposed that divides 
cognitive distortions into two general types. These are “Illusion of control” and 
“Luck/perseverance” (Steenbergh, Meyers, May, & Wehlan, 2002).  
Illusion of Control 
Illusion of control concerns the belief that one can control the outcome of 
chance events (Steenbergh, et al., 2002). PGs compared to non-problem gamblers are 
more likely to be confident that they have skills that can increase their chances of 
winning (Carroll & Huxley, 1994; Myrseth, Brunborg, & Eidem, 2010). Such 
magnified belief in skill is probably the result of the effort gamblers make to 
understand the game and to develop gambling systems (Toneatto, 1999). The fact that 
they sometimes win becomes evidence that they are right about their belief in skill, as 
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gamblers tend to focus more on winning rather than on losing. The magnified belief in 
skills can be upheld by interpretive biases. One such bias is the attributional bias, 
which refers to the tendency people have to attribute wins in terms of own disposition 
and place less emphasis on the role of situational factors (Heider, 1958). It may be the 
case that winning is attributed to own skills, whereas losses are attributed to situational 
factors. Another interpretive bias is called “the Gambler’s fallacy”. The gambler’s 
fallacy is the belief that the likelihood of winning increases with the number of losing 
trials. For instance, if a coin is tossed five times and the result is heads on each toss, 
the Gambler’s fallacy suggests that the likelihood of getting tails on the subsequent 
toss is greater than for getting heads (Croson & Sundali, 2005).  
Luck/perseverance
Luck/perseverance can involve the overestimation of the likelihood of winning 
and the belief that persistence will ultimately lead to winning. Belief in luck often 
involves superstitious beliefs, such as talismanic superstitions, which involve the belief 
that carrying a certain item (such as a ring or a hat) will bring good luck (Toneatto, 
1999). Superstitious beliefs can also be behavioural, such as standing on one foot 
whilst playing a slot machine, kissing the dice before throwing at craps, or yelling 
“come on, come on” whilst watching football on television. The belief in perseverance 
can take the form of “chasing”. Chasing involves trying to win back money that is lost 
and is based on the belief that luck will finally turn. The logic is that there is zero 
chance of winning the money back if he or she stops gambling, but a non-zero chance 
of winning the money back if he or she persists at gambling (Toneatto, 1999). The 
potential problems associated with the belief in perseverance becomes evident in that 
PGs are more likely to indicate agreement with statements such as: “Where I get 
money to gamble doesn’t matter because I will win and pay it back” (Steenbergh, et 
al., 2002, p. 145).  
1.2.3 Personality  
Personality is also among the factors that are regarded as important in the 
development of PG. Biologically based theories of personality seem to converge on 
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two bio-behavioural systems that are important for understanding human behaviour 
(Cattell, 1946; Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993; Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Eysenck, 1967; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Zuckerman, 2007). One system is 
manifested in approach of appetitive stimuli. The other system is manifested in 
inhibition when faced with aversive stimuli. In evolutionary terms, both are vital for 
survival. Approach behaviour towards appetitive stimuli, such as food or sexual 
partners in order to survive and reproduce, is fundamental for any species (Darwin, 
1859/2006). It is also important for survival that individuals inhibit approach 
behaviour when facing aversive stimuli, such as the sight of a lion when hunting game. 
Eysenck (1967) suggested that approach (i.e. Extraversion) is governed by the 
ascending reticular activation system (ARAS), a structure in the brainstem that 
determines the level of cortical arousal. Extroverts have an ARAS that leaves the 
cortex understimulated, and they are likely to approach stimulating environments and 
activities in order to increase cortical arousal. Conversely, the ARAS of introverts 
causes them to be chronically overstimulated. Hence, introverts are likely to avoid 
stimulating environments and activities in order to decrease arousal. Eyseck also 
suggested that individual differences in inhibition (i.e. neuroticism) are due to the 
sensitivity of the limbic system. Individuals high in neuroticism have limbic systems 
that are sensitive to emotional stimuli, while individuals low in neuroticism have 
limbic systems that are more resilient.  
A conceptually similar, but neuro-biologically different, view of approach and 
inhibition was proposed in Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) (Gray, 
1982; Gray & McNaughton, 2000). This theory suggest that approach behaviour is 
governed by an underlying behavioural activation system (BAS), which is mediated 
by the dopaminergic reward circuits in the brain (Depue & Collins, 1999). 
Dopaminergic reward circuits start in the ventral tegmental area of the midbrain and 
project to the ventral striatum (including the neucleus accumbens), amygdala and 
prefrontal cortex (Wise & Rompre, 1989). It has been suggested that individuals high 
in BAS have low basal dopaminergic activity, and that they approach novel stimuli or 
situations in order to increasing dopamine activity to an optimal level (Cloninger, et 
al., 1993).  
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Gray and McNaughton (2000) distinguish between fear and anxiety, both in 
function and neuro-biological basis. Fear is regarded as an individual’s response to 
aversive stimuli, such as the sight of a lion approaching. The response to fear stimuli 
is undirected escape, which is mediated by the brain’s periaqueductal grey, or directed 
escape, which is mediated by the medial hypothalamus. Collectively these are referred 
to as the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS). Importantly, fear of some stimuli can be 
more easily acquired, such as snakes and spiders (Öhman, Dimberg, & Öst, 1985), but 
fear of more inane stimuli can also be learned through the process of aversive 
conditioning, such as fearing electrical outlets, dentists or examination rooms.  
Anxiety is different from fear, as stated by Gray and McNaughton (2000, p. 5): 
“…the forms of behaviour that are appropriate when … a rat must leave an area where 
there is a cat are quite different from those that are appropriate when a rat must enter 
an area where a cat has been or might be”. Anxiety is determined by the behavioural 
inhibition system (BIS), which is neurologically mediated by the septo-hippocampal 
system (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). This is supported by evidence that lesion of the 
septo-hippocampal system has similar anxiety alleviating effects on rat behaviour as 
the ingestion of anxiolytic drugs. The role of BIS is to resolve goal conflicts between 
signals of rewarding and punishing stimuli. An example is when an individual wishes 
to approach a fresh carcass lying on the ground in an area where there might be a lion. 
Such conflicts can be resolved by the septo-hippocampal system by increasing the 
negative affective valence of memories that are associated with goals. If this happens, 
it results in the inhibition of approach behaviour. It has been suggested that inhibition 
is governed by basal serotonergic activity (Cloninger, et al., 1993). Individuals high in 
BIS may have high basal serotonergic activity, and they avoid harmful stimuli in order 
not to further increase the serotonergic activity. However, it has also been argued that 
individuals differences in BIS does not result from differences in basal levels of 
serotonin, but rather, the serotonergic reactivity, as determined by the sensitivity of 
receptor cells (Zuckerman, 2007). Importantly, for the septo-hippocampal system to 
be able to increase the negative valence of memories, the association between a 
stimulus (such as the sight of a dentist) and negative emotion (resulting from pain), 
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must have taken place. Such associations are learned through the process of aversive 
conditioning.  
According to RST, sensitivity to signals of punishment (i.e. punishment 
sensitivity) is a reflection of sensitivity in FFFS and BIS (see Figure 1). Sensitivity to 
signals of punishment (i.e. punishment sensitivity) is a reflection of BAS (Corr, 
2004). Figure 1 shows the hypothesised relationships between FFFS, BIS and BAS, at 
the systems level, and punishment reactivity and reward reactivity at the behavioural 
level (Corr, 2001). Also depicted is how the personality traits Neuroticism and 
Extraversion (Eysenck, 1967) are hypothesised to relate to RST. FFFS and BIS have 
excitatory inputs on punishment reactivity, and inhibitory input on reward reactivity. 
Thus, a person with high FFFS and BIS is likely to be more indifferent to signals of 
reward and to avoid signals of punishment, and also to respond more strongly to 
punishment. BAS has excitatory input on reward reactivity, and inhibitory input on 
punishment reactivity. Thus, a person with high BAS is likely to approach signals of 
reward and ignore signals of punishment, and also to respond more strongly to 
reward. 
 
Figure 1. The hypothesised relationship between punishment sensitivity (FFFS, BIS) 
and reward sensitivity (BAS), and punishment and reward reactivity (Corr, 2001). 
Unbroken lines denote excitatory effects, and broken lines denote inhibitory effects 
(Reprinted with permission from Elsevier). 
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Since instrumental conditioning is often viewed as an important process in 
gambling behaviour, it may be the case that individuals who develop gambling 
problems have high BAS and low FFFS and BIS. Research has shown that PGs show 
impaired decision making on the Iowa gambling task (IGT) (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). The IGT is a card playing task that measures preference 
for large immediate wins accompanied by large losses, resulting in monetary loss over 
time, versus preference for small immediate wins and small losses, resulting in 
monetary gain over time (the IGT is presented in detail in section 2.3.1). For instance, 
one study showed that PGs were more likely to show preference for large rewards and 
large losses than small rewards and small losses (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & 
van den Brink, 2005). Neuroimaging studies have implicated the functioning of 
dopaminergic reward pathways and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in PG (see 
Yacubian & Büchel, 2009 for a review). For instance, in a study using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and a simple gambling task, Reuter et al. (2005) 
found that a PG group showed lower blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response 
in the right ventral striatum during the task compared to healthy controls. This 
indicates that individuals with PG may have impaired activity in the dopaminergic 
reward pathways. Thus, PGs may be more likely to approach signals of reward more 
often because it takes more reinforcement in order to achieve a feeling of reward. 
Whether deficient dopamine reward pathway functioning is a result or a cause of PG 
is unclear, however evidence suggests that genetic variations affecting the distribution 
of dopamine receptors may predispose some individuals to addiction (Yacubian & 
Büchel, 2009).  
PGs may also be less responsive to signals of punishment. For example, one study 
found lower levels of the serotonin metabolite 5-HIAA, a neurotransmitter involved in 
impulse control in the frontal lobes, in the cerebral spinal fluid in a PG group 
compared to a control group (Nordin & Eklundh, 1999). Reuter et al. (2005) also 
found that individuals with PG showed lower BOLD responses in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex during the gambling task compared to the control group (Reuter, et 
al., 2005). This has also been found in previous studies using gambling cues, and a 
Stroop Task (Potenza, Leung, et al., 2003; Potenza, Steinberg, et al., 2003). The 
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ventromedial prefrontal cortex is an area of the brain which is associated with impulse 
control in several disorders (Yacubian & Büchel, 2009). Hence, there is evidence that 
suggests that reward and punishment sensitivity may be different in PGs compared to 
control groups.  
Studies have also measured reinforcement sensitivity in relation to gambling 
behaviour using self-report measures. A common self-report measure of 
reinforcement sensitivity is the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994), that were 
based on a previous version of Gray’s RST (Gray, 1982). The scales contain a BIS 
scale and three BAS sub-scales; Reward Responsiveness (BAS RR), Drive (BAS D) 
and Fun Seeking (BAS FS). Studies of the relationship between BIS/BAS and 
performance on the IGT using these scales have found that BAS RR was positively 
associated with IGT performance in one study (Franken & Muris, 2005), whereas 
BAS RR and BAS FS were negatively associated with IGT performance in another 
study (Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). Furthermore, one study found that individuals with 
low BIS and low BAS showed better IGT performance compared to individuals with 
low BIS and high BAS (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, De Beurs, & van den Brink, 2006). 
Furthermore, in a study using a simulated slot machine, BIS and the BIS/BAS ratio 
were negatively associated with bet-sizes (Demaree, DeDonno, Burns, & Everhart, 
2008). Based on these studies, it is difficult to draw clear conclusions about the 
BIS/BAS and risk-taking relationship.  
The inconsistent findings in these studies may reflect that the BIS/BAS scales are 
based on a theory that has been updated. An attempt has been made to use a different 
parsing of the items in the BIS/BAS scales in order to comply with the revised RST 
(Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Heym, Ferguson, & Lawrence, 2008). The task of 
creating adequate paper and pencil self-report measures of activity in brain structures 
may, however, seem daunting. Psychophysiological measurement, for example fMRI, 
may provide more precise measures, however it is not always practical to use, and 
self-report measures allow for collection of more data, which is crucial in order to test 
models of the development of PG. More studies using the new parsing of the 
BIS/BAS scales should be conducted in order to investigate their predictive power. 
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One aim of this thesis was to further investigate the relationship between 
reinforcement sensitivity and gambling behaviour using self-report measures.  
1.3 Integrated Models of the Development of PG 
In this section, three integrated models of the development of PG are described 
that include the roles of learning mechanisms, cognitive distortions and personality. 
These models are called “The Biopsychosocial Model of Pathological Gambling”  
(Sharpe, 2002), “The Syndrome Model of Addiction” (Shaffer, et al., 2004), and “The 
Pathways Model of Problem and Pathological Gambling” (Blaszczynski & Nower, 
2002).  
1.3.1 The Biopsychosocial Model of Pathological Gambling  
An integrative model for why some gamblers lose control and develop 
gambling problems is Sharpe’s (2002) “Biopsychosocial Model of Pathological 
Gambling” (see Figure 2). According to this model, some individuals have a genetic 
vulnerability that affects the functioning of dopaminergic, serotonergic and 
noradrenergic neurotransmitter pathways in the brain. This may infer a psychological 
vulnerability for developing gambling problems including traits such as impulsivity. 
The early environment may also contribute to the forming of attitudes towards 
gambling, as parents and early social environments can affect an individual’s own 
attitudes towards gambling.  
Early experiences with gambling may lead to a psychological vulnerability for 
developing gambling problems. For instance, individuals who respond strongly to 
positive reinforcement but respond weakly to punishment may be particularly 
vulnerable for developing problems with fast paced games that give regular small 
payouts and small losses, such as electronic gaming machines. Individuals with poor 
problems-solving skills, such as thinking ahead and creating solutions may also be at 
greater risk for developing gambling problems. Experience with gambling may affect a 
perceptual filter for interpreting wins and losses. This is especially relevant for 
individuals who have early experiences of big wins and who expect that big wins will 
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occur again. Experiencing a series of many small wins may also lead to irrational 
beliefs such as an illusion of control over gambling outcomes, and the belief that 
persistence will lead to payout. Cognitive biases may develop that make individuals 
pay more attention to winning than to losing, resulting in an overestimation of the 
chances of winning later in the gambling session, or in a future gambling session.  
In Sharpe’s (2002) model it is assumed that gambling behaviour is developed 
and maintained through the processes of classical and operant conditioning. This 
builds on Anderson and Brown’s (1984) suggestion that gambling can become 
associated with excitement through classical conditioning, and that excitement can 
serve as a conditioned positive reinforcer for continued gambling. Further, since wins 
during gambling are analogous to intermittent reinforcement on a variable ratio 
schedule, it gives a strong breeding ground for cognitive distortions.  
According to Sharpe (Sharpe, 2002; Sharpe & Tarrier, 1993), the classically 
conditioned association between gambling and excitement, and gambling-related 
cognitions can both act as triggers that lead to an urge for gambling. In addition, 
gambling urges may be mediated by life circumstances. Here, it is differentiated 
between different types of gamblers, for instance horse race gamblers and electronic 
machine gamblers. For horse race gamblers, boredom may be a trigger for gambling 
because they gamble in order for the excitement of gambling to displace boredom. In 
electronic machine gamblers, on the other hand, life circumstances that evoke stress or 
dysphoric mood may trigger gambling because they gamble to escape from stress or 
dysphoric mood.  
Triggers for gambling and the urge to gamble can be suppressed by coping 
strategies, e.g. controlling arousal, and challenging misconceptions about gambling. In 
the event that the urge to gamble leads to gambling, winning during gambling leads to 
further gambling related cognitions through feelings of mastery and belief in luck. 
Losing during gambling also leads to further gambling related distortions, for instance 
the belief in reciprocal altruism and the idea that a slot machine is “due” for a payout. 
Losing money may also lead to a host of financial and social problems, and gamblers 
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may gamble more in order to alleviate negative emotions associated with such 
problems. 
 
 
Figure 2. A Biopsychosocial Model of Pathological Gambling (reprinted with 
permission from Elsevier). 
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In summary, Sharpe’s model (2002) integrates bio-psychological vulnerability, 
gambling experiences, arousal and perceptions of gambling as predispositional factors 
for experiencing gambling problems, and a cycle of triggers and urges to gamble as an 
explanation for why gambling problems are maintained. 
1.3.2 The Syndrome Model of Addiction 
An integrative model for the development of several forms of addiction is the 
syndrome model of addiction (Shaffer, et al., 2004). This model builds on evidence 
that several forms of addictions share commonalities, and may have shared 
antecedents, see Figure 3. The antecedents for developing addiction according to 
Shaffer et al. (2004)  include interactions between neurobiological elements, such as 
genetic and neurobiological risk factors, as well as psychosocial elements such as 
social support and religiosity. This may influence whether the individual is likely to 
develop addiction. Also among the antecedents is varying degrees of exposure to 
substances and behaviours that can be addictive. If an at-risk individual is exposed to 
objects of addiction, neurobiological consequences such as experiencing reward or 
euphoria can take place. If repeated experiences with the object of addiction takes 
place, and the experience is positive, it is likely that an addiction develops if the 
individual is not somehow prevented for further experiences. According to Shaffer et 
al (2004) this course of development is common in several addictions including 
gambling, drinking alcohol, smoking and drug use. The expressions of different 
addictions are also similar. Furthermore, individuals with the syndrome are at risk for 
continued addictive behaviour, as well as for the development of other addictions.  
 Shaffer et al.’s model (2004) is similar to Sharpe’s (2002) model in that it 
includes the interaction between underlying vulnerability and experiences with 
gambling. It is emphasised that the experience of gambling needs to alter mood for 
addiction to develop. Furthermore, gambling becomes associated with a pleasurable 
mood state. This association can be learned through classical conditioning. The main 
difference between the two models is that Sharpe (2002) places more emphasis on the 
role of cognitive distortions, whilst Shaffer et al. (2004) places more emphasis on the 
shift towards associating gambling with a pleasurable mood state. Since gambling 
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Figure 3. Model of the addiction syndrome (reprinted with permission from 
Routledge). 
 
can lead to winning or losing, it may be the case that some individuals learn to 
associate gambling with pleasure, whilst other individuals learn to associate gambling 
with displeasure. It could also be the case that predispositional factors determine 
whether gambling becomes associated with pleasure or displeasure.   
 
1.3.3 A Pathways Model of Problem and Pathological Gambling 
An integrative model which proposes three pathways for the development of 
gambling problems was postulated by Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) (presented in 
Figure 4). A basic premise for all three pathways is that gambling opportunities must 
be available. Common to all three pathways are the processes of classical and 
instrumental conditioning described by Sharpe and Tarrier (1993). Here, gambling 
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becomes associated with excitement through exposure to winning during gambling, 
and this excitement subsequently becomes a conditioned positive reinforcer for  
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Figure 4. A pathways model of problem and pathological gambling (reprinted with permission 
from John Wiley and Sons). 
continued gambling. Once gambling becomes a habit, cognitive distortions such as 
illusion of control and belief in perseverance become apparent.  
According to Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) the first of the three pathways 
comprises behaviourally conditioned gamblers who do not have premorbid conditions 
that predisposes them to develop gambling problems. They mainly develop gambling 
problems because of the processes of classical and operant conditioning that 
accompany exposure to gambling and cognitive distortions surrounding probabilities 
of winning. As such, they are not characterised by impaired control over gambling 
behaviour. 
The second pathway comprises emotionally vulnerable gamblers. This group is 
subjected to the same processes as in pathway one, but in addition they have 
premorbid emotional disorders, poor problem-solving skills and a history of poor 
family background and negative developmental background. 
The third pathway comprises individuals who may have bio-behavioural 
dysfunction with subsequent psychological disorders and psychosocial interference 
that becomes apparent in their gambling behaviour. In addition to showing the same 
predisposition to becoming PGs as in pathway two, the pathway three gamblers also 
have impulse control disorders and/or antisocial personality disorder, which causes 
pathological gambling as well as poor psychosocial functioning. 
Blaszczynski and Nower’s (2002) model is similar to Sharpe (2002) and Shaffer 
et al.’s (2004) models in that the processes of classical and instrumental conditioning 
are implicated. Indeed, for the pathway one gamblers, these processes are the most 
important explanatory factors for the development of gambling problems. In pathways 
two and three, classical and instrumental conditioning are also viewed as important, 
but here underlying emotional and personality factors are also viewed as playing a 
role. The main point that sets Blaszczynski and Nower’s (2002) model apart from the 
two other models is that individuals with gambling problems are not seen as one 
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homogenous group, and that the pathway to developing gambling problems can be 
different for individuals with different predispositional characteristics.  
1.4 Relating Conditionability to PG 
The processes of classical and instrumental conditioning are included in all three 
integrated models of the development of PG. Both Sharpe (Sharpe, 2002; Sharpe & 
Tarrier, 1993) and Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) mention classical and instrumental 
conditioning explicitly as a fundamental process pertaining to all individuals who 
develop PG. Shaffer et al. (2004) include the role of classical and instrumental 
conditioning implicitly, as they view the association between a pleasurable mood state 
and an object of addiction to be fundamental in the development of addiction. These 
models take into account that personality traits such as impulsivity can predispose 
some individuals for developing gambling problems, as impulsive individuals more 
readily seek positive reinforcement and are less affected by punishment. However, the 
models do not include individual differences in classical conditioning. Research has 
shown that there are considerable differences in the degree to which individuals show 
classical conditioning (Merrill, Steinmetz, Viken, & Rose, 1999). Eysenck (1959) has 
called an individual’s ability to acquire classical conditioning “conditionability”. A 
question that arises is whether individual differences in conditionability may 
predispose some individuals to be more likely to develop PG. Perhaps individuals with 
increased appetitive conditionability are more likely to develop gambling problems 
because they more readily learn to associate the gambling environment with 
excitement. Acquisition of this conditioned relationship is crucial for excitement to 
become a conditioned reinforcer for gambling behaviour.  
As mentioned previously, gambling can become appetitive, as a result of 
successful gambling sessions. But gambling can also become aversive, as a result of 
unsuccessful gambling sessions. Little evidence is available that supports the 
hypothesis that individuals who develop gambling problems have stronger appetitive 
conditionability. However, a comparison between PGs and social gamblers found that 
on average the PG group showed greater arousal (measured by skin conductance level) 
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when imagining gambling scenarios compared to the group of social gamblers 
(Sharpe, 2004). This indicates that PGs have acquired stronger classical conditioning 
between gambling and excitement compared to social gamblers. However, it is unclear 
whether stronger conditionability was present prior to the development of gambling 
problems, or whether the PG group had developed a stronger association because of 
more exposure to gambling. Thus, more research that investigates this hypothesis is 
required. 
Whether individuals who develop gambling problems have diminished aversive 
conditionability is also understudied, and only indirect evidence is available.. For 
instance, studies have found diminished aversive classical conditioning in individuals 
with alcohol-use disorder (McGlinchey-Berroth et al., 1995; McGlinchey-Berroth, 
Fortier, Cermak, & Disterhoft, 2002). As alcohol-use disorder is a condition often 
found to be co-morbid with PG (e.g. Petry, et al., 2005), it could be the case that 
individuals who have diminished aversive conditionability are vulnerable for 
developing PG as well as alcohol-use disorders. However, it is unclear whether 
diminished conditionability is a result of excessive alcohol intake, or whether 
individuals with alcohol use disorders would have shown diminished aversive 
conditionability before drinking excessively over time. 
Research into psychopathy and criminal behaviour may also provide clues 
about the relationship between aversive conditionability and PG. A line of research has 
built on Eysenck’s (1977) argument that repeated criminal behaviour can be seen in 
individuals who have difficulties associating the negative consequences of criminal 
behaviour with committing crime. According to Eysenck (1977) a person’s conscience 
consists of classically conditioned associations. Since lacking a conscience is 
characteristic of psychopathy (currently referred to as antisocial personality disorder), 
a fundamental characteristic of psychopaths may be that they have diminished aversive 
conditionability. This has been supported in studies showing that psychopaths do 
indeed have diminished aversive conditionability (Hare, 1978). In relation to 
gambling, an interesting study was conducted where psychopaths were recruited from 
Gamblers Anonymous (Hare & Quinn, 1971). The study found that the psychopaths 
showed diminished physiological responding in the anticipation of presentations of a 
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loud burst of noise, compared to a control group. As the experiment group comprised 
psychopaths recruited from Gamblers Anonymous, they were problem gamblers as 
well as psychopaths, and this may suggest that diminished responding in the 
anticipation of an unpleasant event could also be true for PGs. However, it is difficult 
to determine the directionality of the relationship from this study, or whether the 
finding would also hold true for PGs who are not psychopaths.  
Further indirect evidence is available in studies of persons with brain damage 
that disrupts the formation of physiological responses to specific events. For example, 
a study was conducted that investigated how patients with damage to the prefrontal 
cortex performed on the IGT (Bechara, et al., 1994). The results showed that the 
patients with prefrontal cortex damage compared to a control group were more likely 
to favour immediate high rewards in the face of great losses over time over low 
immediate rewards resulting in winning over time. The researchers referred this as 
“myopia for the future”. Perhaps the brain damage had disrupted the ability to acquire 
or recall aversive classical conditioning, ultimately leading to the inability to learn to 
avoid making risky choices. This assumption is supported by the finding that aversive 
conditioning evokes neural responses in the frontal cortex (Gottfried, et al., 2002). 
Myopia for the future may resemble what PGs display throughout their gambling 
careers. They will sometimes take great risks in the hope that they win large sums of 
money in the immediate future rather than take smaller risks to avoid losing substantial 
sums over time. Indeed, this was supported in a study which showed that a PG group 
had poorer performance on the IGT compared to a control group (Goudriaan, et al., 
2005). 
In summary, there is some indirect evidence that PGs may have diminished 
aversive conditioning, which can help explain why they develop PG. However, as no 
studies have investigated this question directly, further research is warranted in order 
to ascertain whether this is indeed the case. One aim of this thesis is to further 
investigate this question. 
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1.5 A Note on Gambling and Risk-taking in Laboratory 
Studies 
A venue for studying basic mechanisms in relation to gambling behaviour is the 
laboratory. As the laboratory can provide a great deal of experimental control, its use 
can provide important evidence for understanding the relationship between individual 
factors such as conditionability and personality, and gambling behaviour. Such 
evidence may in turn shed light on the dispositional factors and processes involved in 
the development of PG. 
Laboratory studies of gambling behaviour in non-clinical samples have used 
several different tasks that are more or less analogous to commercial gambling games, 
for instance, the IGT (Bechara, et al., 1994) and a simulated slot machine (Demaree, et 
al., 2008). Whilst such gambling tasks may be analogous to commercial gambling 
games, they can perhaps also be construed as measures of risk-taking or risk-
avoidance. In the risk-taking literature there has been a move from understanding risk-
evaluation as a purely cognitive process (e.g. Anand, 1993) to also including the role 
of emotions. This move became evident with the risk-as-feelings hypothesis 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). Here, behaviour is guided not as much 
by cognitive risk evaluation, but rather by anticipatory emotions. Anticipatory 
emotions may result from the process of classical conditioning. If a decision 
alternative becomes associated with positive emotions, it may become an appealing 
alternative. However, if a decision alternative becomes associated with negative 
emotions, it may be avoided. For individuals with a deficiency in making such 
associations, it has been found that risky decision making on the IGT may prevail 
(Bechara, et al., 1994).  
It is important to bear in mind that laboratory tasks of gambling are measures of 
risk-taking. Gambling behaviour does not only involve the risk-taking behaviour 
gamblers display when gambling. An important part of gambling behaviour is the fact 
that gamblers chose to come back another day to gamble more, and this is not 
captured by using risk-taking tasks in the laboratory. Additional factors that set 
gambling apart from laboratory risk-taking tasks is the reallocation of wealth where 
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winners gain at the expense of losers, and that losses can be avoided simply by not 
taking part in the game (Griffiths, 1995). These factors are not accounted for in the 
laboratory, therefore laboratory studies of gambling are not entirely ecologically valid. 
Thus, gambling in the laboratory should be construed as measures of gambling 
behaviour when gambling, or more generally, risk-taking/risk-avoidance. Still, studies 
using laboratory gambling tasks can provide valuable knowledge about the 
relationship between for instance personality and gambling behaviour, but may not 
account for every aspect of gambling behaviour in real life. 
1.6 Heart Rate Variability and Gambling Behaviour 
Research has shown that gambling, both in the laboratory and in real gambling 
venues, is associated with elevated heart rate (Anderson & Brown, 1984). Also, 
imagining gambling scenarios has been found to cause larger increase in tonic levels 
of skin conductance in PGs compared to a control group (Sharpe, 2004). Tonic 
measures of heart rate and skin conductance are often referred to as arousal caused by 
increases in sympathetic nervous system activation (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 1990). 
However, such a view may be rudimentary as it neglects the complexity of the 
autonomic nervous system. According to the “polyvagal theory” (Porges, 1995), the 
autonomic nervous system is made up of three stages, each resulting from demands 
that arouse during human evolutionary history. The first of the stages has the 
behavioural function of immobilisation seen in feigning death or passive avoidance of 
threat. This immobilisation system innervates the heart via the unmeyelinated vagus 
and it originates in the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus. The second stage in the 
evolution of the autonomic nervous system comprised the addition of a mobilisation 
system, which could aid active avoidance responses to threats in the environment. This 
mobilisation system innervates the heart via the sympathetic adrenal system, which 
originates in the spinal cord. The third and most evolutionary recent stage added 
behavioural functions associated with social communication, inducing a calm state and 
the inhibition of arousal. This stage involves reduction of the heart rate and is 
mediated by the myelinated vagus, which originates in the nucleus ambiguus. The 
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Polyvagal theory proposes autonomic response strategies to challenges in the 
environment (Porges, 2007). When the environment is safe, the body state is regulated 
to save energy and promote growth. This is done by increasing myelinated vagus 
innervation to the cardiac pacemaker, which slows the heart down and inhibits the 
sympathetic nervous system’s fight flight state.  
Since only the myelinated vagus is capable of making fast paced adjustments to 
the heart rate, myelinated vagus innervation can be recorded by separating the high-
frequency component of heart rate variability (the fluctuations in the inter-beat interval 
between successive heart beats) from the slower components (Porges, 2007). Heart 
rate variability (HRV) has consequently been used in recent years as an improved 
measure of autonomic trait and state. HRV usually refers to the high frequency band of 
HRV, and is also called respiratory sinus arrhythmia because it co-varies with 
spontaneous breathing. Low HRV indicates a state of low myelinated vagus 
innervation to the heart and indicates a shift from a relaxed state to a more stressed 
state due to sympathetic nervous system control of the heart. Low HRV is associated 
with increased risk of mortality from several causes (Dekker et al., 1997). HRV has 
also been found to be associated with prefrontal cortex activity (Thayer, Hansen, Saus, 
& Johnsen, 2009). Behaviourally, HRV has been positively associated with inhibition 
of impulses, as well as with increased adaptation to demands in the environment 
(Thayer & Brosschot, 2005). High resting HRV has been found to predict performance 
on tests of executive functioning (Hansen, Johnsen, & Thayer, 2003), as well as 
situational awareness (Saus et al., 2006).  
In relation to gambling, studies have found that PGs show decreased activity in 
the prefrontal cortex when performing a simple gambling task, compared to a control 
group (Reuter, et al., 2005). Since prefrontal cortex activity has been associated with 
HRV (Thayer, et al., 2009) it can be assumed that PGs would also show lower HRV 
when gambling. A re-analysis of Anderson and Brown’s (1984) comparison of 
pathological and social gamblers could provide support for this hypothesis. However, 
since such a comparison could be confounded by extraneous variables such as general 
health, smoking, anxiety and depression, lab studies of risk taking when gambling 
could shed light on the question of whether degree of HRV suppression is related to 
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risk-taking when gambling. One possibility is that individuals who show high HRV 
suppression perform better on a gambling task because they mobilise sufficient mental 
resources to perform the task sufficiently. Another possibility is that individuals who 
show low HRV suppression perform better on a gambling task because they do not go 
into fight-flight mode, which can be associated with heuristic thinking. As little 
research has been conducted which can be related to this question, more research 
investigating HRV in gambling behaviour may be warranted. One aim of this thesis is 
to further investigate this question.    
1.7 Aims 
1.7.1 Thesis Aims 
Based the foregoing review of the literature, there is need for more research that 
investigates the relationships between conditionability and gambling behaviour, 
reinforcement sensitivity and gambling behaviour, and HRV and gambling behaviour. 
This thesis reports from three empirical studies, each with specific aims, and the 
studies build on each other successively. Since there is dearth of research that has 
studied aversive conditionability in relation to gambling, the first aim of this thesis was 
to investigate the relationship between aversive conditionability and risk-taking. The 
relationship between reinforcement sensitivity and risk-taking, and the relationship 
between HRV and risk-taking were also assessed to investigate whether these 
variables would explain variation in risk-taking alongside aversive conditioning. The 
next step was to also investigate whether appetitive conditioning was related to risk-
taking along with aversive conditioning, and to investigate if reinforcement sensitivity 
also would contribute to explaining variation in risk-taking. The final step was to 
investigate whether aversive conditioning was diminished in PGs by comparing a 
group of PGs with a control group.  
1.7.2 Specific Aims Study 1 
The aim in Study 1 was to investigate whether individual differences in aversive 
conditionability as measured using a differential aversive classical conditioning 
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paradigm is associated with risk-avoidance on the IGT. Since this question is general 
in nature, a student sample was used. In addition, the study aimed at investigating 
associations between behavioural activation and behavioural inhibition, using the 
BIS/BAS scales, and risk-avoidance on the IGT. Also, the study aimed at investigating 
whether individual differences in baseline HRV and suppression of HRV during the 
IGT was associated with risk-avoidance on the IGT. To achieve these aims 
information about anxiety and depression, nicotine and alcohol use, gambling 
problems and executive functioning was collected in order to investigate whether 
aversive conditionability, behavioural activation and behavioural inhibition, and HRV 
would explain variation in risk-avoidance beyond these factors.  
1.7.3 Specific Aims Study 2  
The aim of Study 2 was to investigate whether appetitive and aversive 
conditionability, as measured using an EC paradigm, were associated with preferred 
bet-sizes on a simulated slot machine. Since this question is general in nature, a 
student sample was used. Also, study 2 aimed at investigating whether behavioural 
activation, behavioural inhibition and the fight-flight-freeze system, using the 
BIS/BAS scales with a parsing of BIS items that reflect Gray’s updated reinforcement 
sensitivity theory, were associated with bet-sizes on the simulated slot machine. 
1.7.4 Specific Aim Study 3 
The aim of Study 3 was to investigate whether PGs would show diminished 
aversive conditioning, as measured using a differential aversive classical conditioning 
paradigm, by comparing a PG group with a control group. Information about age, 
gender, tobacco use, alcohol use, and anxiety and depression was collected in order to 
determine the equality of the two groups. 
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2. Method  
The following section contains a description of the self-report measures, 
psychophysiological measures, and the experimental tasks and paradigms used in the 
three studies included in this thesis. The subsequent procedure section describes which 
measures were used in each study, and in which sequence. 
2.1 Self-report Measures 
2.1.1 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales (HADS) 
HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a self-report measure of non-vegetative 
symptoms of anxiety and depression. Seven items are used to measure anxiety and 
seven items are used to measure depression. A four point scale is used in order for 
respondents to indicate their agreement with each item, ranging from 0 to 3. The 
composite score for each scale ranges from 0 to 21. The clinical cut-off point for both 
anxiety and depression is a score of 8 or above.  
2.1.2 Tobacco Use 
Smoking. Smoking habits was measured using two questions. The first asked 
“what are your smoking habits? Do you smoke daily, sometimes or never?” 
Participants indicated their response by ticking one of three boxes; daily, sometimes or 
never. The second question was: “If you smoke, how may cigarettes do you normally 
smoke per day? Indicate the number (both ready made cigarettes and rollies). There 
was a line underneath this question where participants could write the number of 
cigarettes.  
Snus use. Snus is ground tobacco that comes in pouches or in loose form and 
is placed under the lip. Snus use was measured using two questions. The first question 
was “How often do you use snus?” Participants indicated their response by ticking one 
of three boxes; daily, sometimes or never. The second question was “If you use snus, 
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how many times do you use snus per day?” There was a line underneath this question 
where participants could write the number.  
2.1.3 Fast Alcohol Screening Test (FAST) 
FAST (Hodgson, Alwyn, John, Thom, & Smith, 2002) is used to assess the 
magnitude of alcohol use. It contains four items. The first asks how often a person 
drinks more than six (for women) or eight (for men) drinks. Respondents indicate the 
frequency on a five point scale ranging from never to daily or almost daily. The 
second question asks how often during the last year it has been impossible to 
remember what happened the previous night because of drinking. Respondents 
indicate the frequency on a four point scale ranging from never to two to three times a 
week. The third question asks how often he/she did not do things they were supposed 
to because of drinking. Respondents indicate the frequency by using the same response 
alternatives as for the previous question. The fourth question asks whether a family 
member, friend or physician has expressed worry about alcohol use and suggested a 
reduction in alcohol use. Here, participants respond by indicating no, yes, on one 
occasion, or yes, on more than one occasion. The composite score ranges from 0 to 16, 
and the cut-off point for hazardous drinking is a score of 3 or more. 
2.1.4 South Oaks Gambling Screen – Revised (SOGS-R) 
SOGS-R (Lesieur & Blume, 1993) is the most commonly used paper-and-pencil 
test to screen for gambling problems. It consists of eleven questions concerning 
gambling habits and negative consequences of gambling, and an additional nine 
questions concerning borrowing money from various people and institutions to finance 
gambling. Participants respond to each question by ticking off yes or no. Scores range 
from 0 to 20. A score of 0 indicates “no problem with gambling”, a score of 1-4 
indicates “some problems with gambling”, and a score of 5 or more indicates that the 
individual is a “probable pathological gambler”.  
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2.1.5 The Behavioural Inhibition/Behavioural Activation Scales 
(BIS/BAS Scales) 
The BIS/BAS Scales (Carver & White, 1994) were developed to measure BIS 
and BAS according to Gray’s original RST (Gray, 1982). The scale consists of twenty 
items. The BIS scale (seven items) is used to measure predisposition to avoid 
threatening or punishing stimuli, and the BAS scale (thirteen items) is used to measure 
predisposition to approach appetitive stimuli. Three BAS sub-scales are often used; 
BAS Drive (four items), BAS Fun Seeking (four items), and BAS Reward 
Responsiveness (five items). In order to comply with the updated Reinforcement 
Sensitivity Theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), an alternative parsing of the BIS 
items has been proposed (Heym, et al., 2008). The alternative parsing divides the BIS 
items into the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) (three items), which measures fear 
when facing aversive stimuli, and BIS-Anxiety (BIS-Anx) (four items), which 
measures behavioural inhibition. Participants respond to each item on a four point 
scale ranging from very true for me to very false for me. Scores on the scales therefore 
range from the number of items times 1 to the number of items times 4. 
2.2 Psychophysiological Measures 
2.2.1 Skin Conductance 
Skin conductance is a measure of the skin’s ability to conduct an electrical 
current. Skin conductance increases as the level of moisture in the skin increases, 
which is determined by activity of the eccrine sweat glands (Andreassi, 2007). The 
unit of measurement is micro-mho (also known as microSiemens). Skin conductance is 
highly correlated with bursts of sympathetic nervous system activity (Dawson, et al., 
1990), and may therefore be used to measure phasic changes in sympathetic nervous 
system activity. The change in skin conductance following a stimulus presentation, 
such as in a classical conditioning paradigm, is referred to as the skin conductance 
response (SCR) (Andreassi, 2007).  
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To measure skin conductance, two unshielded 8 mm Ag-AgCl electrodes filled 
with isotonic gel were used. These were attached using an adhesive ring to the middle 
phalanx of the index and middle fingers on the non-dominant hand. The electrodes 
were plugged into a Biopac MP35 system, and recorded using BSL PRO software 
(BIOPAC Systems Inc., 2007). The skin conductance signals were analysed using 
Mindware EDA (Mindware Technologies Ltd, 2007). A SCR was determined as the 
largest change in skin conductance level during ten seconds following stimulus onset 
with a one second delay. The smallest response recorded was a .04 microSiemens 
change in skin conductance level. To adjust for individual differences in maximum 
skin conductance level, Lykken and Venables’ (1971) range correction was used. 
2.2.2 Heart Rate Variability (HRV) 
HRV is a tonic measure of the variability in duration of the inter-beat-intervals 
between successive heart beats. At the level of the heart it reflects parasympathetic 
nervous system activity (Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and the 
North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology, 1996). To record cardiac 
activity, three disposable 10 mm electrodes (EL503, Biopac Systemts, Inc.) were used. 
Two of the electrodes were placed 15 cm below the left and right nipple, and the third 
was placed 20 cm below the left armpit. A Biopac MP-35 unit and Biopac Student Lab 
software (BIOPAC Systems Inc., 2007) was used to record cardiac activity at a rate of 
1000 Hz. The power in ms² of the high frequency band (0.15-0.4 Hz) component of 
HRV was determined using autoregressive power spectrum analysis in Kubios 
(Biosignal Analysis and Medical Imaging Group, 2007). All values were transformed 
to their natural logarithms in order to obtain a normal distribution of scores.  
2.2.3 Heart Rate Responses (HRR) 
Heart rate responses are measures of phasic changes in heart rate. In response to 
a stimulus or event, two different components of HRR have been identified (Graham 
& Clifton, 1966; Thayer, Friedman, Borkovec, Johnsen, & Molina, 2000). One 
component is a deceleration of heart rate which occurs rapidly following stimulus 
onset. This deceleration is associated with orientation and increased attention. The 
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second component is an acceleration of heart rate often occurring after the orienting 
response. This acceleration is associated with a defence reflex (Graham & Clifton, 
1966).   
Cardiac activity was measured by the same means as heart rate variability, see 
section 2.2.2. To analyse HRR, Mindware HRV version 3.0.1 (Mindware 
Technologies Ltd., 2008) was used. Baseline inter-beat-intervals (IBIs) were 
calculated as the average of the three IBIs occurring before stimulus onset. Five 
consecutive IBISs (measured in milliseconds) following stimulus onset comprised the 
window of analysis. These were subtracted from the baseline to calculate delta scores 
(IBI). 
2.3 Experimental Tasks and Paradigms 
2.3.1 The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) 
The IGT (Bechara, et al., 1994) is a card playing task where a participant is 
presented with four decks of cards (labelled A, B, C and D) on a computer screen. The 
participant is instructed to pick a total of 100 cards from the four decks by pressing 
corresponding keys on the computer keyboard. With each selected card the participant 
gains a set amount of money, $100 on decks A and B, and $50 on decks C and D. On 
deck A and B, the participant also loses large amounts of money, leading to monetary 
loss over time, whilst on decks C and D, the losses are smaller, and can lead to 
monetary gain over time. Therefore, the IGT measures preference for large immediate 
wins accompanied by large losses, resulting in monetary loss over time, versus 
preference for small immediate wins and small losses resulting in monetary gain over 
time. Selecting from the advantageous C and D decks rather than from the 
disadvantageous A and B decks can be regarded as indicating learned risk-avoidance. 
The IGT was programmed using E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2005) 
according to Bechara et al.’s (1994) specifications.  
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2.3.2 The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
The WCST (Berg, 1948; D. A. Grant & Berg, 1948) was developed as a 
technique for measuring flexibility in thinking. The standard computer version 
distributed by PAR Inc. was used (Heaton, PAR Staff, & Goldin, 2003). The test starts 
with the presentation of four cards on a computer screen. Each card is printed with a 
symbol; one red triangle, two green squares, three yellow crosses, or four blue circles. 
The participants’ task is to sort the cards according to one of three rules. The rule can 
be the colour of the symbol on the cards, the shape of the symbol on the cards, or the 
number of symbols on the cards. The participant needs to figure out what the rule is by 
trial and error, and sort cards according to the rule. After a number of correct attempts 
at sorting, the rule will change, and the participants need to figure out what the new 
rule is. The WCST provides a number of performance indicators. The most used 
indicators are the number of errors made, and the number of perseverative errors 
(sorting cards according to the “old” rule). The perseverative errors are used as an 
index of flexibility in thinking, or executive functioning. 
2.3.3 Aversive Conditioning  
Two different aversive conditioning paradigms were used, the first in Study 1 
and the other in Study 3. In both paradigms auditive stimuli were used and presented 
in mono to both ears via padded head-phones. Auditive stimuli were obtained using 
audio generator software. Two tones were used as CS, a 1500 Hz tone and a 850 Hz 
tone. These were played back at 65 dB. The US was white noise played back at 100 
dB. 
Aversive Conditioning Paradigm in Study 1 
In the paradigm used in Study 1, the duration of the CS was 1350 ms, and the 
duration of the US was 1000 ms. For one half of the participants the CS+ was the 1500 
Hz, and the 850 Hz tone was the CS-. For the other half of the participants, the 1500 
Hz tone was the CS-, and the 850 Hz tone was the CS+.  
The paradigm consisted of two phases. The first was an acquisition phase. Here, 
the CS+ and the CS- were presented pseudo-randomly eight times each with a 12 s 
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inter-trial interval. The CS+ was immediately followed by the US, whereas the CS- 
was never followed by the US. The second phase of the paradigm was an extinction 
phase. This was identical to the acquisition phase, but the US did not follow the CS+. 
Aversive Conditioning Paradigm in Study 3 
In the paradigm used in Study 3, the duration of the CS was 8000 ms, and the 
duration of the US was 1000 ms. For one half of the participants, the CS+ consisted of 
the 1500 Hz tone, and the 850 Hz tone comprised the CS-. For the other half of the 
participants, the 1500 Hz tone was the CS-, and the 850 Hz tone was the CS+.  
The paradigm consisted of two phases. The first was the habituation phase. Here, 
the to-be CS+ and the to-be CS- were presented pseudo-randomly three times each 
with an inter-trial interval alternating randomly between 12 s and 18 s (with the rule 
that one should not be presented more than twice in succession). 
The second phase of the paradigm was the acquisition phase. The CS+ and CS- 
were presented ten times each in a pseudo-random order. As in the habituation phase, 
the inter-trial interval alternated randomly between 12 s and 18 s. The CS+ was always 
followed by the US, and the CS- was never followed by the US. 
2.3.4 Evaluative Conditioning 
The evaluative conditioning (EC) paradigm comprised a version of the picture-
picture paradigm (Levey & Martin, 1987). The picture stimuli used were eighteen 
pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005). The IAPS includes a pre-rating of each picture on valence and 
arousal. Twelve of the pictures used were pre-rated as neutral in both valence and 
arousal. These were pictures of  the shadow of a person (IAPS # 2880), an iron (7030), 
a dustpan, (7040), a rolling pin (7000), a spoon (7004), a bowl (7006), a lamp (7175), 
a bus (7140), an umbrella (7150), a fan (7020), wooden buckets (7041) and a storage 
room (7700). Three pictures were used that were pre-rated as positive in valence and 
high in arousal. These were pictures of a man and woman making love (4695), 
downhill skiers (8190), and children on a roller-coaster (8499). Three pictures were 
used that were pre-rated as negative in valence and high in arousal. These were 
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pictures of a crying baby (2800), a man pointing a gun at another man (3530), and a 
man carrying a burnt and lifeless child (9410).  
The EC paradigm was programmed on a computer using E-prime software 
(Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2005), and run on a desktop computer with an 18 
inch computer screen. The EC paradigm consisted of four phases. The first phase was 
the pre-evaluation phase where all eighteen pictures were presented in random order. 
Participants were instructed to look at each picture. Each picture was presented on the 
screen for 2 s, and the inter-trial-interval was 2 s.    
The second phase was the pre-conditioning phase. Participants were instructed to 
rate each picture on a 100-point visual analogue scale (VAS), where the left hand 
extreme was labelled ”dislike” and the right hand extreme was labelled ”like”. All 
eighteen pictures were presented on the screen in random order, each presentation 
lasting 2 s.  
The third phase was the conditioning phase. Here, the participants were 
instructed to look at the pictures on the screen. Nine CS-US picture pairs were 
assembled for this phase. Three pairs were neutral-positive, three pairs were neutral-
negative, and three pairs were neutral-neutral. The CS was presented on the screen for 
1 s, followed by a 100 ms inter-stimulus-interval, and subsequently the US was 
presented for 1 s. Each of the picture pairs were presented five times in random order. 
 The fourth phase was the post-conditioning phase. This phase was identical to 
the pre-conditioning phase, and participants rated all the pictures again. 
2.3.5 The Hordaland Slot Machine 
The Hordaland Slot Machine was created (by this author) in order to measure 
preferred level of risk-taking when gambling. It was programmed using E-Prime 
software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2005). The Hordaland Slot Machine 
comprises a screen showing a picture of a slot machine as shown in Figure 5. A 
display in the top left corner shows the bank, the amount that is left to play with. The 
amount is given in Norwegian kroner (NOK). The exchange rate is roughly 100 NOK 
= € 13 = $ 19.   
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Figure 5. The Hordaland Slot Machine 
 
The number of trials left is displayed below the bank. In the top centre of the slot 
machine is a display where the amount won on the current trial is presented. The game 
is played by pressing one of the number keys (1, 2 … 9) on a computer keyboard. 
When a key is pressed, a sound is played back which resembles the sound of the 
handle being pulled and released. The numbers on the keyboard determines the bet-
size for each spin times 10. For example, pressing the “1” key equals a bet-size of 10 
NOK, and pressing the “9” key equals a bet-size of 90 NOK.  
Before gambling, participants are informed that the game resembles a slot 
machine, that they play 100 spins, that they start with 3000 NOK, that they can keep 
10% of the amount left in the bank after the 100 spins, and that they decide the bet-size 
for each spin by pressing the number keys.  
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For each spin, three different outcomes can occur. The first is that the win is nil, 
and the wager is deducted from the bank. This has a 70% chance of occurring. The 
second possible outcome is a small win accompanied by a sound resembling a fast 
siren. The small win equals the bet-size times 2.25, and has a 20% chance of 
occurring. The small win is added to the bank, and the wager is deducted from the 
bank. The third possible outcome is a big win accompanied by a sound resembling the 
drop on thin metal of several handfuls of coins. The big win equals the bet-size times 
4.5 and has a 10% chance or occurring. The big win is added to the bank, and the 
wager is deducted from the bank. The three outcomes are selected randomly by the 
computer software.  
2.4 Samples and Procedures 
2.4.1 Sample and Procedure Study 1 
Sample
The sample in Study 1 consisted of 61 undergraduate students recruited during 
lectures for the subject “Introduction to Psychology” at the University of Bergen. A 
list with spaces for names and telephone numbers was passed around the lecture 
theatre. Those who wrote their names on the list were contacted via telephone to set up 
times for participation. The participants in the study were 31 female and 30 male 
students with an age range of 18 to 28 years. Three participants were excluded from 
the study, one due to abnormal cardiac activity, and two due to equipment failure. 
Thus, the final participants numbered 58 (29 females, 29 males).  
Procedure
Participants were instructed not to consume caffeine and nicotine two hours prior 
to appearing at the testing facility. The testing facility was a sound attenuated and 
temperature controlled laboratory room where the temperature was kept at 22 degrees 
Celsius. It contained a comfortable armchair, which was separated from the laboratory 
equipment by an office cubicle wall. Upon entry, each participant read and signed an 
  
53
informed consent form explaining the purpose of the study, the procedure, and that the 
data collected would be treated confidentially. Thereafter, the participant was fitted 
with electrodes and assigned to the armchair.  
The procedure was as follows: 
1. Five minutes recording of baseline heart rate. 
2. Aversive conditioning paradigm, see section 2.3.3. 
3. The IGT, see section 2.3.1.  
4. The WCST, see section 2.3.2. 
5. Five minutes recording of recovery heart rate. 
6. Completing a questionnaire consisting of the HADS (section 2.1.1), 
Tobacco use (section 2.1.2), FAST (section 2.1.3), SOGS-R (section 
2.1.4) and the BIS/BAS scales (section 2.1.5).  
Before leaving the laboratory, all participants were paid 100 NOK (about € 13). 
The study was approved by the Regional Committees for Medical and Health Research 
Ethics in West-Norway, and by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
2.4.2 Sample and Procedure Study 2 
Sample
The sample in Study 2 consisted of 100 undergraduate students recruited in the 
same way as the sample in Study 1. The participants were 51 women and 49 men with 
a mean age of 21.01 years (SD = 2.49). None of the participants were probable 
pathological gamblers, as none scored 5 or more on the SOGS-R.  
Procedure
Data were collected in a multiple-testing laboratory at the University of Bergen. 
The laboratory contained five sound attenuated chambers. Each chamber contained a 
desk, a chair, and a desktop computer. Participants arrived in groups of up to five. 
Information about the study and assurance that the data collected would remain 
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confidential was given, and an informed consent sheet was signed prior to assignment 
to the chambers.  
The procedure was as follows: 
1. Completion of a questionnaire comprising the SOGS-R (section 2.1.4) and 
the BIS/BAS scales with the parsing of BIS items suggested by (Heym, et al., 
2008) (section 2.1.5). 
2. The EC paradigm (see section 2.3.4). 
3. The Hordaland Slot Machine (see section 2.3.5). 
Before leaving the laboratory, all participants were paid 10% of the amount that 
was left in the bank of the Hordaland Slot Machine, ranging from 168 NOK to 368 
NOK. The study was approved by the Regional Committee for Medical and Health 
Research Ethics in West-Norway 
2.4.3 Sample and Procedure Study 3 
Sample
The sample in Study 3 consisted of two groups. One was a group of 20 PGs (17 
male, 3 female). Mean age was 40.4 years (range 24-76, SD = 14.47). The PG group 
was recruited through advertisements in local newspapers, and from three treatment 
facilities, one in Western Norway and two in Eastern Norway. A control group (n = 20 
[17 male, 3 female], mean age 39.3 years [range 22-71, SD = 14.51]) was recruited via 
advertisements in local newspapers, and among university students and staff. The 
control group was recruited with the aim to match each individual in the PG group on 
gender, and on age plus/minus 5 years. The average SOGS-R score for the PG group 
was 12.50 (range = 7 – 17, SD = 2.67). The average SOGS-R score for the control 
group was 0.60 (range = 0 – 4, SD = 1.05).  
Procedure
The data collection took place in three locations. Thirteen of the individuals in 
the PG group and all individuals in the control group were tested in the same 
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laboratory room as was used in Study 1. Seven other individuals in the PG group were 
tested in offices located at one of two treatment facilities in Eastern Norway. These 
were the Borgestad Clinic divisions in Drammen and Skien. The offices were quiet 
and heated, however the exact room temperature was not recorded.  
 All participants read an information sheet explaining the purpose of the study 
and assurance that all data would be treated in a confidential manner. All participants 
signed an informed consent form. Before testing, participants were fitted with ECG 
electrodes and headphones, and were assigned to a comfortable arm-chair. The 
procedure was as follows:  
1. A five minute resting period 
2. A differential aversive classical conditioning paradigm, see section 2.3.3 
3. Completion of a questionnaire consisting of Tobacco use (see section 2.1.2), 
FAST (see section 2.1.3), HADS (see section 2.1.1), and SOGS-R (see 
section 2.1.4) 
Finally, participants were debriefed and electrodes were removed. All 
participants received a payment of 200 NOK (about €25) for their participation. The 
procedure was approved by the Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research 
Ethics in Western-Norway.  
2.5 Statistics 
2.5.1 Statistical Procedures Study 1 
To determine aversive conditioning, for each participant the average magnitude 
of skin conductance responses following stimulus onset of CS- were subtracted from 
the average magnitude of skin conductance responses following stimulus onset of 
CS+. Inspection of the score distribution showed that 26 participants had a score of 
zero. Therefore scores were recoded into a dichotomous variable where these 26 
participants comprised a group named aversive conditioning minus (AC-). The 32 
participants who did show aversive conditioning according to the operational 
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definition comprised a group named aversive conditioning plus (AC+). The risk-
avoidance variable comprised the number of cards each participant chose from the 
advantageous decks on the IGT. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated for variables at interval level, 
whereas point-biserial correlation coefficients were calculated for relationships 
between variables measured at interval level and variables measured at dichotomous 
variables. Phi coefficients were calculated for relationships between dichotomous 
variables. Backward stepwise multiple regression analysis was used to investigate 
which variables could significantly predict levels of risk-avoidance. In addition, 2 x 5 
repeated measures ANOVA was used to further investigate differences between the 
AC+ and AC- groups on risk-avoidance. Here, the number of cards chosen from 
advantageous decks on the IGT were divided into five stages each consisting of 20 
consecutive trials. Group (AC+ vs. AC-) was a between group factor, Stage (5 blocks 
of 20 cards) was a within subjects factor, and the number of cards chosen from the 
advantageous decks was the dependent variable. Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
used as a statistical correction as the Maulchy’s test showed that the assumption of 
sphericity was violated. 
2.5.2 Statistical Procedures Study 2 
A manipulation check was performed in order to test whether the positive, 
negative and neutral pictures used as US in the EC paradigm were rated differently 
from one another. Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted where US type 
(positive US vs. negative US vs. neutral US) was the independent factor, and valence 
measured on the VAS comprised the dependent variable. The effect of EC with 
negative and positive US were tested separately using repeated measures ANOVA. In 
both analyses, Time (pre-conditioning vs. post-conditioning) was the independent 
factor and valence rating on the VAS was the dependent variable. Since a significant 
proportion of participants had change scores on the VAS that were smaller than one 
point for positive US or negative US, and because the scores lacked a normal 
distribution, dichotomous variables were constructed for use in the analyses (0 = did 
not show conditioning, 1 = did show conditioning).  
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The statistical methods used in the analyses were Pearson’s product-moment 
correlations between variables at interval level, and point-biserial correlations for the 
relationship between dichotomous variables and variables at interval level. The 
interaction between positive EC and negative EC on average bet-size was tested using 
a 2 (positive EC: yes vs. no) by 2 (negative EC: yes vs. no) ANOVA with average bet-
size as the dependent variable. Follow-up pairwise comparisons (t-test) were used to 
further explore the interaction effect. 
The FFFS x BAS-RR interaction effect was tested using multiple regression 
where FFFS, BAS-RR and the FFFS x BAS-RR interaction term were entered as 
predictor variables, and where average bet-size was the dependent variable. The 
interaction effect was plotted graphically according to suggestions from Cohen, 
Cohen, West and Aiken  (2003).    
2.5.3 Statistical Procedures Study 3 
Differences in self reported co-morbidity between the PG and the control group 
in Study 3 were analysed using Pearson’s Chi-square and independent samples t-tests.  
To test whether there were differences between the two groups in terms of 
habituation, the HRR following stimuli presentation for the three CS+ were collapsed 
into one block. The same was done for the three CS- presentations. A 2 (Group: PG vs. 
control) x 2 (Stimuli: CS+ vs. CS-) x 5 (IBIs) ANOVA was conducted where Group 
was a between-subjects factor, Stimuli and IBIs were within-subjects factors, and 
where IBI comprised the dependent variable. Subsequently, pairwise comparisons (t-
tests) of Stimuli on IBIs were calculated for each group to investigate differences 
between the two groups.  
To test whether there were differences between the two groups concerning 
acquisition of aversive conditioning, HRR were collapsed into three blocks. The HRR 
on the first trial were left out because this was the first CS+-US pairing, and therefore 
no conditioning could have taken place. The subsequent nine trials were collapsed into 
three blocks. The first block comprised trials 2-4, the second block comprised trials 5-
7, and the third block comprised trials 8-10. A 2 (Group: PG vs. control) x 2 (Stimuli: 
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CS+ vs. CS-) x 3 (Blocks: Block 1 vs. Block 2 vs. Block 3) x 5 (IBIs) ANOVA was 
conducted where Group was a between-subjects factor, Stimuli, Blocks and IBIs were 
within-subjects factors, and IBI comprised the dependent variable. The ANOVA was 
followed up using pairwise comparisons (t-tests). Pairwise comparisons of Stimuli 
(CS+ vs. CS-) were made on each of the IBIs. This was done for each group 
separately. 
For the ANOVA conducted to test differences in habituation and for the 
ANOVA conducted to test differences in acquisition of aversive conditioning, the 
assumption of sphericity was violated. Therefore, Greeenhouse-Geiser corretions were 
made to the degrees of freedom.  
 A-priori power analysis was computed. Expected effect size was set to d = 0.08, 
alpha was set to 0.05 (one-tailed) and power was set to 0.80. This power analysis 
showed that 21 participants were needed in each group to yield a power of 0.80 given 
the stated parameters.  
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3. Results 
3.1 Results Study 1 
 Bivariate correlations showed that aversive conditioning was significantly and 
positively correlated with risk-avoidance, r = .30, p <. 05. Anxiety, depression, 
nicotine use, alcohol use, SOGS, WCST, resting HRV, HRV suppression and the 
BIS/BAS scales were not significantly correlated with risk-avoidance. 
 Multiple regression showed that aversive conditioning was the only variable 
that contributed significantly to explaining variance in risk-avoidance, ß = .30, p = 
.023. The variance explained (R²) was 9%. 
 Repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect for the aversive 
conditioning factor, F(1, 56) = 5.30, p = .025. The AC- group (M = 45.69, SD = 11.92) 
chose fewer cards from advantageous decks on the IGT compared to the AC+ group 
(M = 53.78, SD = 13.84). A significant effect of Stage was also found, where the 
participants overall chose fewer cards from the advantageous decks on the first stage 
compared to the fourth and fifth stage, showing a gradual increase in card selection 
from the advantageous decks over time. The difference between the AC- and AC+ 
groups were greatest on the third, or middle, stage. 
 In summary, study 1 showed a positive association between aversive 
conditioning and risk-avoidance. 
3.2 Results Study 2 
Bivariate correlations showed that FFFS-Fear (r = .23, p < .05), BAS-Total (r = 
.22, p = < .05), and BAS-RR (r = .24, p = < .05) were positively correlated with 
average bet-size.  
 The ANOVA showed that there were no main effects of positive EC or negative 
EC on average bet-size. The positive EC by negative EC interaction effect was, 
however, significant, F(1, 79) = 8.40, p <  .01. Follow-up pairwise comparisons 
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showed that the group of participants that did not show positive EC or negative EC 
had lower average bet-size compared to the three other groups (the group that showed 
negative EC but not positive EC, the group that showed positive EC but not negative 
EC, and the group that showed both negative and positive EC). 
 Multiple regression analysis showed that FFFS, BAS-RR, and the FFFS x BAS-
RR interaction effect were significant predictor variables for average bet-size. The 
participants who had low scores on both BAS-RR and FFFS had lower average bet-
size compared to the other participants. The model explained 14% of the variance in 
average bet-size.  
3.3 Results Study 3 
Bivariate correlations and chi-square analysis showed that the PG group, 
compared to the control group, comprised more daily smokers, and had higher average 
scores on symptoms of anxiety and depression. However, none of the participants had 
anxiety or depression scores within the clinical range. The PG group and the control 
group did not differ on snus use or alcohol use.  
The ANOVA comparing the PG group with the control group on habituation 
showed that the two groups did not differ in habituation.  
The ANOVA comparing the PG group with the control group on aversive 
conditioning showed that the conditioning phase had different effects on the PG group 
and the control group. The PG group did not show conditioning whereas the control 
group did show conditioning. This was corroborated by a significant interaction effect 
for Group x Stimuli x Blocks x IBIs, F (4.42, 167.97) = 3.37, p = 009. Follow-up 
pairwise comparisons showed that for the PG group there were no differences in HRR 
to the CS+ and CS-, apart from on IBI 5 in Block 3 (p = .038). However, for the 
control group significant differences between CS+ and CS- were found on IBI1 in 
Block 1 (p = .005). Significant differences between CS+ and CS- were also found on 
IBI 2 (p = .030), IBI 3 (p = .001) and IBI 5 (p = .010) in Block 2. Also, significant 
differences between CS+ and CS- were found on IBI 2 (p = .012), IBI 3 (p = .010), 
and IBI 4 (p = .005) in Block 3.   
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In summary, the PG group showed diminished aversive conditioning compared 
to the control group. 
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4. Discussion 
One aim of this thesis was to explore the relationship between individual 
differences in classical conditioning and gambling behaviour. The three studies 
reported in this thesis addressed this question. Study 1 investigated whether individual 
differences in aversive conditioning was associated with risk-avoidance on the IGT 
(Bechara, et al., 1994). The results showed that participants who did not show aversive 
conditioning also showed less risk-avoidance on the IGT. This finding is in line with 
previous research that showed that individuals with diminished ability to develop 
aversive somatic reactions to losses on the IGT continue to display more risky 
decision-making compared to individuals who do not have such a deficiency (Bechara, 
et al., 1994). The finding is also in line with the risk-as-feelings hypothesis 
(Loewenstein, et al., 2001), which states that anticipatory emotions to risk alternatives 
may guide behaviour. Lacking the ability to acquire aversive anticipatory emotions 
may be why the non-conditioners showed less risk-avoidance. 
Study 1 also investigated whether individual differences in baseline HRV and 
suppression of HRV during the IGT would be associated with differences in risk-
avoidance on the IGT. The results showed that baseline HRV and HRV suppression 
were not associated with IGT performance. This finding was unexpected given that 
associations between HRV and executive functioning have previously been reported 
(Hansen, Johnsen, Sollers III, Stenvik, & Thayer, 2004; Hansen, et al., 2003). Since 
IGT performance in addition was also not associated with performance on the WCST, 
this may suggest that IGT performance is more contingent on aversive conditioning, 
rather than on executive functioning or cognition.  
Study 1 also investigated whether BIS and BAS would be associated with risk-
avoidance on the IGT (Bechara, et al., 1994). The results showed no associations 
between any of the BIS/BAS scales and IGT performance. This finding was not 
expected given that a previous study found associations between risk-taking and the 
BIS and the BIS/BAS ratio score (Demaree, et al., 2008). A likely explanation for this 
discrepancy concerns the operationalisation of risk-taking. Demaree et al. (2008) used 
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bet-sizes on a simulated slot machine, whereas the IGT was used in Study 1. Bet-sizes 
may be a more explicit measure of risk-taking compared to decision making on the 
IGT. With choosing bet-size, the game can immediately be switched from less risky to 
more risky, and vice versa, hence the individual has more control over the task. What 
constitutes risk taking on the IGT is perhaps less explicit, as it gradually becomes 
evident which cards should be avoided to avoid large losses. In that sense, the IGT is 
perhaps better construed as a measure of risk-avoidance rather than risk-taking. It 
could be speculated that individual differences in BIS and BAS may be more strongly 
associated with explicit rather than implicit risk decision making, and thereby explain 
the discrepant findings. The results from Study 1 are consistent with other studies that 
have reported no significant relationship between BIS and risk-avoidance (Franken & 
Muris, 2005; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). These studies have also reported both positive 
and negative relationships between BAS and risk-avoidance, and as Study 1 did not 
find a significant positive or negative relationship between any of the measures of 
BAS, more research is warranted to investigate this relationship, or to explain the 
discrepancies in findings.  
Study 2 followed up on Study 1 by further exploring the relationship between 
conditioning and gambling behaviour, and BIS/BAS and gambling behaviour. In Study 
2 appetitive conditioning was included in addition to aversive conditioning. In order to 
do this, an EC paradigm was employed that included both positive EC and negative 
EC. The outcome measure was also changed from the IGT (Bechara, et al., 1994) to a 
new simulated slot machine (the Hordaland slot machine, see section 2.3.5), since it 
may be more similar to commercially available gambling products. Study 2 
investigated whether appetitive conditioning and aversive conditioning, were 
associated with preferred bet-sizes on the Hordaland slot machine. No main effects of 
appetitive or aversive conditioning were found on average bet-size. The interaction 
effect of appetitive conditioning and aversive conditioning was, however, significant 
and showed that the group of participants that did not show appetitive or aversive 
conditioning had lower average bet-size compared to the three other groups. A 
possible explanation for this finding may be that the participants who showed 
appetitive conditioning may have become influenced by positive events during 
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gambling, and this may have caused them to increase their bet-sizes in order to win 
even more money. Conversely, the participants who showed aversive conditioning 
may have become influenced by negative events during gambling, which may have 
caused them to increase their bet-sizes in order to chase their losses. The participants 
who showed both appetitive and aversive conditioning may have been influenced by 
both these processes, whilst the participants who did not show either may not have 
been influenced by either of these processes. 
The results from Study 1 and Study 2 regarding the relationship between 
conditioning and risk-taking appear to contradict each other. However, the discrepancy 
in findings may be explained by some notable differences between the gambling tasks 
used in the two studies. The IGT involves gradually learning to avoid risky choices. 
On the Hordaland slot machine, however, there is no obvious strategy for avoiding 
loss of money. This suggests that the individuals in Study 2 who were conditionable 
tried to win or avoid losses by varying their bet-size, which resulted in higher average 
bet-size. In addition, there were some notable differences concerning the 
operationalisation of conditioning in the two studies. The physiological responses 
measured in the aversive conditioning paradigm in Study 1 may be qualitatively 
different from the self-reported changes in terms of liking in the EC paradigm. Skin 
conductance measurement bypasses cognitive control of responses and taps the 
physiological responses mediated by the sympathetic nervous system (Dawson, et al., 
1990). Self-reported change in evaluation of pictures may be regarded as a more 
cognitive measure, as it has been shown to be influenced by contingency awareness 
(Walther & Nagengast, 2006).  Thus, the two means of operationalising conditioning 
may be different. In addition, there is an ongoing debate concerning whether or not 
classical conditioning and EC measure the same underlying mechanism. For example, 
aversive classical conditioning may involve the learning of fear, whilst EC may 
involve the learning of disliking (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & 
Crombez, 2010).  
Study 2 also built on the findings from Study 1 by further investigating the 
relationship between BIS/BAS and gambling behaviour. This time an alternative 
parsing of the items in the BIS/BAS scales were used that complies more closely with 
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the updated Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Heym, et 
al., 2008). In the updated theory, a distinction is made between the flight-fight-freeze 
system (FFFS) and BIS-Anxiety. FFFS is viewed as an individual’s response to both 
primary aversive stimuli and conditioned aversive stimuli, whilst BIS-Anxiety 
represents inhibition of approach behaviour in circumstances where there might be 
aversive consequences. The results from Study 2 showed that FFFS was positively 
associated with average bet-size. This finding was somewhat surprising given that 
individuals who readily develop fear responses are assumed to avoid risk (Bechara, 
2003). However, the finding was in line with findings from a previous study which 
found that punishment sensitivity was positively associated with risk-taking on the 
IGT (Davis, Patte, Tweed, & Curtis, 2007). A possible explanation for this is that 
individuals who react strongly to fear stimuli react strongly to losing money, which in 
turn may case them to increase bet-sizes in order to chase their losses.  
The results from Study 2 also showed that BAS-scores were positively 
associated with average bet-size. Among the BAS sub-scales, only BAS-RR was 
associated with average bet-size, hence the BAS-average bet-size relationship may be 
attributed solely to this sub-scale. This finding was in line with findings from a 
previous study where BAS-RR was positively associated with risk-taking on the IGT 
(Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). It is likely that high BAS-RR individuals should respond 
more positively to winning money during gambling compared to low BAS-RR 
individuals, since scores on BAS-RR reflects the degree to which a person experiences 
positive emotions when experiencing rewards (Carver & White, 1994). It is possible 
that the more positively individuals experience rewards, the more likely they are to 
gamble with high bet-sizes since high bet-sizes yield greater rewards.  
The results from Study 2 also showed that there was an interaction effect 
between FFFS and BAS-RR on average bet-size. Among the participants who scored 
low on BAS-RR, only those who also scored low on FFFS scored lower on average 
bet-size compared to the other participants. This interaction effect indicates that FFFS 
may have moderating effect on the relationship between BAS-RR and risk-taking.  
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Both of the interaction effects in Study 2 suggest the operation of the same 
underlying process, that not showing appetitive conditioning or aversive conditioning, 
and scoring low on BAS-RR and low on FFFS, are associated with low average-bet 
size. Overall, it seems that individuals who are not easily affected by stimuli in general 
are also not affected by gambling to the extent that they play with high bet-sizes. It 
could be that individuals who are influenced by EC more easily develop illusion of 
control over the game and varied their bet-size more often, or conversely, that those 
who are unaffected by EC are more resistant to development of illusion of control. 
Individuals who are able to stay “cool” may play more rationally and play with low 
bet-sizes, since cognitively it may appear as if this is the best strategy for keeping as 
much of their money as possible.  
Study 3 built on the findings from Study 1 and Study 2 by investigating whether 
a PG group would show diminished aversive conditioning compared to a control 
group. Since Study 1 showed that the not-conditioning group showed less risk-
avoidance on the IGT, it was hypothesised that PGs would have diminished aversive 
conditioning. The results showed that the control group showed aversive conditioning, 
but that the PG group did not show aversive conditioning. This finding suggests that 
PGs may have deficiencies in neural structures that mediate aversive conditioning, 
such as the amygdala (Campeau, et al., 1992), the hippocampus, the anterior 
cingulated cortex, the insula and the medial temporal lobe (Sehlmeyer, et al., 2009). 
However, studies using neuroimaging are required to further investigate if this is the 
case. The finding in Study 3 is in accordance with previous indirect evidence for 
diminished aversive conditioning in PG. First, the results are in line with the finding 
from Study 1 showing that individuals who did not show aversive conditioning 
showed less risk-avoidance on the IGT. Individuals who have a deficiency in learning 
to associate losses during gambling with negative emotional responses are less likely 
to avoid risk, which means poor performance on the IGT, and perhaps also continued 
gambling behaviour that may develop into PG. The finding from Study 3 is also in line 
with the finding that psychopaths who were recruited from Gambler’s Anonymous 
showed weaker physiological responses to repeated presentation of a neutral tone that 
preceded an aversive tone (Van Tharp, Maltzman, Syndulko, & Ziskind, 1980). Study 
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3 showed that a similar tendency was evident in a sample of PGs recruited via 
newspapers and treatment clinics.  
The finding in Study 3 was also in line with previous research showing 
diminished aversive conditioning in alcohol use disorders (McGlinchey-Berroth, et al., 
1995; McGlinchey-Berroth, et al., 2002). Alcohol use disorders are among the most 
common co-morbid disorders for PG (Petry, et al., 2005) and it could be the case that 
diminished conditioning is a pre-dispositional factor for the development of both 
alcohol use disorders, PG and perhaps also other forms of addiction. It is unclear 
whether diminished aversive conditioning is a cause of or a result of alcohol use 
disorders, as excessive alcohol consumption may cause brain deterioration 
(McGlinchey-Berroth, et al., 2002). However, The PG sample in Study 3 did not differ 
from the control group in hazardous alcohol use, and only 4 of the 20 participants in 
the PG group scored above the cut-off point for hazardous alcohol use. This suggests 
that the diminished aversive conditioning found in the PG group cannot be attributed 
to brain deterioration caused by excessive alcohol consumption. This indicates that 
that diminished conditioning may be pre-dispositional factor for the development of 
PG, however, more research is needed in order to further support this hypothesis.   
In general, the finding from Study 3 may be in line with the suggestion that 
individuals with diminished aversive conditionability are likely to repeat harmful 
behaviour (Eysenck, 1977). It seems likely that individuals who fail to associate the 
harmful consequences of their behaviour with their behaviour will continue to display 
harmful behaviour. A question that arises is whether diminished aversive conditioning 
is a result of genetic predisposition, or whether it is a result of life experiences. Studies 
have shown that monozygotic twins show greater similarity in conditionability 
compared to dizygotic twins, which suggests a genetic influence on conditionability 
(Hettema, Annas, Neale, Kendler, & Fredrikson, 2003; Merrill, et al., 1999). Another 
possibility is that some individuals show emotional numbing as a result of traumatic 
childhood experiences, which may explain diminished aversive conditionability in 
adulthood. Neuro-imaging studies have shown that adults who experienced abuse 
during childhood had decreased hippocampus size (Bremner et al., 1997; Stein, 
Koverola, Hanna, Torchia, & McClarty, 1997). Since the hippocampus is one of the 
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neural structures involved in aversive conditioning (Sehlmeyer, et al., 2009), this 
suggests that childhood experiences may be a causal factor for diminished aversive 
conditionability in adulthood. Since there is evidence for both heritability in 
conditionability and for the role of experience in diminished conditionability, it is 
possible that an interaction between genes and environment determines level of 
conditionability.  
The results of the three studies indicate that individual differences in 
conditionability may play a role in the development and maintenance of gambling 
behaviour and PG. Previous research has also suggested that individual differences in 
reinforcement sensitivity are associated with gambling behaviour and pathological 
gambling (e.g. Franken & Muris, 2005; Goudriaan, et al., 2005, 2006; Nordin & 
Eklundh, 1999; Potenza, Leung, et al., 2003; Potenza, Steinberg, et al., 2003; Reuter, 
et al., 2005). The process of classical and instrumental conditioning is included in the 
three integrated models that attempt to explain the development of PG. In Sharpe and 
Tarrier’s (Sharpe, 2002; Sharpe & Tarrier, 1993) and Blaszczynski and Nower’s 
(2002) models, classical and instrumental conditioning is mentioned explicitly as a 
fundamental process in the development of gambling problems. Shaffer et al. (2004) 
also includes the role of classical and instrumental conditioning in their model of the 
addiction syndrome, however more implicitly. They view pleasurable mood state 
associated with object of addiction (e.g. gambling) as fundamental in the development 
of addiction. Since the studies presented in this thesis show that individual differences 
in conditionability are associated with risk-taking when gambling and also that PGs 
show diminished aversive conditionability, classical conditioning may be viewed as a 
pre-dispositional factor for the development of PG in addition to being viewed as an 
important process in the development of PG. Individuals with increased appetitive 
conditionability may be more likely to develop gambling problems since they may 
more readily learn to associate the gambling environment with excitement. This 
hypothesis has gained some support (Sharpe, 2004). This suggested that PGs hold 
stronger classically conditioned associations between gambling and arousal compared 
to no-problem gamblers. The results from Study 3 adds to this field of enquiry by 
suggesting that PGs may less readily associate gambling with negative outcomes. In 
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summary, this research suggests that PGs may have pre-disposition for more easily 
associating gambling with positive rather than negative emotions. In combination with 
evidence that implicates the role of reinforcement sensitivity in gambling behaviour, 
the findings reported in this thesis suggest that the effects of the processes of classical 
and instrumental conditioning for gambling behaviour are contingent on individuals’ 
conditionabililty and reinforcement sensitivity.  
4.1 Implications 
4.1.1 Theoretical Implications 
The three studies may hold several implications for future research. Since the 
three studies were the first to investigate the role of aversive conditioning in gambling 
behaviour, the findings should be replicated by other research groups in order to 
corroborate the findings. Most importantly it is necessary to replicate Study 3. The 
enquiry into conditioning in PG may benefit from using larger sample sizes, and 
contrast a PG group with other clinical groups, such as patients suffering from anxiety 
disorders or alcohol use disorder in addition to a non-pathological group to investigate 
whether such groups differ in conditioning from the PG group. There is also further 
need to investigate the relative importance of appetitive and aversive conditioning in 
such an enquiry, though it may be difficult to find an appetitive US which is equal in 
magnitude to stimuli that is commonly used as aversive US. Future research may also 
investigate the relative importance of the acquisition of appetitive conditioning and the 
extinction of acquired appetitive conditioning since individual differences in both may 
be important for gambling behaviour and PG. With the advent of neuro-imaging 
techniques, a way forward is the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
in investigating conditionability in relation to gambling. 
The relationship between BIS/BAS and gambling behaviour also requires further 
study. Since the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994) are based on an outdated 
version of Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Gray, 1982), there may be a need to for 
new instruments. While an adjustment of the scoring of the BIS/BAS scales is 
available (Heym, et al., 2008), and instruments have been developed (Jackson, 2009) 
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to measure the updated theory (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), these measurements are 
in need of further validation. Nevertheless, using self-report measures to assess neural 
systems does require a leap of faith, and perhaps efforts should be concentrated on 
measures of behaviour rather than the underlying neural mechanisms that mediate 
behaviour. 
 Future studies should make efforts to ensure better gender balance in studies of 
conditionability and gambling, since there has been too little emphasis on female 
gamblers in the literature. This would also allow for investigation of possible gender 
differences in the development and maintenance of PG. Individual differences in 
conditioning can only be one part of the picture that attempts to explain the 
development and maintenance of gambling behaviour and PG. To determine the role 
of conditioning, studies are required that include several of the known factors for the 
development of gambling behaviour and PG in addition to individual differences in 
conditioning. If such studies employ longitudinal designs it is also possible to 
determine the directionality of conditioning and gambling, as well as possible 
mediating and moderating factors. 
4.1.2 Practical Implications 
The results of Study 3 may hold implications for treatment of PG. In the event 
that future studies corroborate the finding that PGs have diminished aversive 
conditionability, an implication concerning the use of aversion treatment for PG may 
become evident. If PGs do not readily acquire aversively conditioned associations, 
therapy that attempts to associate gambling with negative emotions may not prove 
sufficiently efficacious to warrant its use. Research has shown some effect of aversion 
treatment for PG, but also that aversion treatment may be less efficacious compared to 
cognitive behavioural therapy (Pallesen, Mitsem, Kvale, Johnsen, & Molde, 2005). A 
reason for this may be diminished aversive conditionability in PG.  
Future studies may investigate the efficacy for extinction treatment for PG. This 
would involve extinguishing classically conditioned associations between gambling 
and excitement, and may be a promising avenue for further treatment research for PG 
as well as anxiety disorders and addictions (Quirk & Mueller, 2008)  
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4.2 Strengths and Limitations 
4.2.1 Strengths 
A particular strength of Study 1 was that the group that did show aversive 
conditioning and the group that did not show aversive conditioning did not differ on 
anxiety, depression, tobacco use, alcohol use, gambling problems, executive 
functioning, resting or suppression of HRV or BIS/BAS. Therefore, the differences 
between the two groups on risk-avoidance could not be attributed to any of these 
factors. In Study 2, a particular strength was the use of real money on the Hordaland 
Slot Machine. This strengthens the ecological validity of the task and may generate 
gambling behaviour similar to the gambling behaviour that would have been displayed 
in a naturalistic setting. A particular strength of Study 3 was that the PG group and the 
control group were matched on gender and age. The two groups did not differ in terms 
of hazardous alcohol use, and none of the participants were in the clinical range for 
anxiety or depression, therefore the differences in aversive conditioning may not be 
attributed to these factors. 
All the three studies are among the first studies to directly investigate the role of 
classical conditioning in gambling behaviour and PG. Therefore they represent an 
important contribution to a field of enquiry that has been largely neglected empirically. 
Finally, a strength concerning all three studies was that they avoided the issue of 
common method variance, as independent and dependent variables were measured 
using separate methodologies (e.g. conditioning was measured using 
psychophysiology and gambling behaviour was measured using gambling tasks). This 
also avoided the reliance on self-report measures, which is characteristic of much of 
the research in psychology.  
4.2.2 Limitations 
The studies reported in this thesis have several limitations. The first limitation 
concerns the samples that were used in Study 1 and Study 2. Both samples were from 
populations of undergraduate university students and not randomly drawn from the 
community, and the sample comprised persons with restricted age range. Therefore, 
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the results cannot be generalised beyond student populations without reservations. In 
Study 3 sample size was low, but comparable to similar studies in the field (e.g. 
Sharpe, 2004; Van Tharp, et al., 1980). Larger sample sizes would have yielded 
greater statistical power, which would have allowed for the identification of group 
differences with smaller effect sizes. The PG sample in Study 3 was not randomly 
drawn from the population of PGs in the community and the control group was also 
not randomly drawn from the non-PG population, therefore the findings cannot be 
generalised beyond the sample without reservations. The sex distribution was skewed 
in favour of males, which also makes it difficult to generalise the results to the female 
population. Though the PG group and the control group were matched on sex and age, 
the PG group comprised more smokers, and it is possible that this confounded the 
results. Therefore, the study should be replicated with a sample of non-smokers, or a 
balanced number of smokers in the PG group and the control group. The PG group 
also had higher average scores on anxiety and depression. This is also a possible 
confounder, albeit these differences were rather small and none of the individuals in 
either group had anxiety or depression scores that were within a clinical range.  
Study 3 did not differentiate between PGs who had different gambling 
preferences. Sharpe (2002) suggested that triggers for gambling may be different for 
gamblers who gamble to escape from their life circumstances and gamblers who seek 
excitement and avoid boredom. The inclusion of groups of PGs with different game 
preferences, for instance one group of slot machine gamblers, a group of horse race 
gamblers, and a group of poker players would have allowed for a comparison of these 
subsets of gamblers. Future studies may consider such a design if they have access to 
large enough groups of gamblers. Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) also suggested that 
PGs may have had different pathways to developing PG, and that the pathways to 
developing PG are determined by predispositional factors. The inclusion of groups of 
PGs who have followed the three pathways may have allowed for comparisons of 
these groups, and future studies may consider such a design if access to large numbers 
of PGs is granted.  
 Studies 1 and 2 have limited ecological validity as gambling took place in a 
laboratory. It has been shown that casino gambling and laboratory gambling can be 
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experienced differently (Anderson & Brown, 1984), therefore it is possible that 
conducting the study procedures in casinos or other gambling venues would yield 
different results. Studies 1 and 2 also employed gambling tasks that were different 
from available gambling games. This is especially the case in Study 1 where the IGT 
was used. While it has been claimed that the IGT can be considered an ecologically 
valid gambling task (Goudriaan, et al., 2005), it differs from commercial gambling 
games in that it is possible to lose more money than the value of the wager. Therefore, 
it was attempted to use a measure of gambling which more closely resembled available 
gambling games by constructing the Hordaland Slot Machine for Study 2. However, 
although real money was used with the Hordaland Slot Machine in order to improve 
ecological validity, this money was provided by the experimenter, and was not the 
participants own money, which is usually the case in real gambling.   
 There were also limitations concerning measurement. In Study 1, the focus in 
the aversive conditioning paradigm was on the extinction phase, and the design did not 
allow for scoring the acquisition of aversive conditioning since the interval between 
CS onset and US onset was too short for scoring of skin conductance responses. The 
conditioning paradigm in Study 1 did not include an habituation phase. Therefore, it 
was not possible to determine if the SCRs to the CS+ and CS- were different before 
the acquisitioning phase, or if the two groups had different responses to the CS before 
the acquisitioning phase. The focus in Study 1 concerned whether or not the 
participants had learned the association after the acquisitioning phase. If the study had 
compared differences in the acquisition phase, this could have made the results of 
Study 1 more directly comparable to Study 3, since Study 3 focused on the acquisition 
of aversive conditioning.  
In Study 2 a total of eighteen participants were excluded from the EC analysis 
because they failed to rate the positive US more positively than the CS they were 
paired with, and the negative US more negatively than the CS they were paired with. 
Hence, the EC paradigm did not work for these participants. Therefore it is possible 
that the US could have been stronger (positive or negative) and it is also possible that 
some CS were not free from previous association. The loss of eighteen participants 
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could have influenced the results, however, it is difficult to forecast in which direction 
these participants would have influenced the results.  
Another measurement issue, which is a possible limitation, is that in Study 1 
and Study 2, the internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) was low for the BAS-FS and 
BAS-RR subscales. This questions whether the items reflect underlying 
unidimensional concepts. If the scales had comprised more items and had greater 
internal consistency this could have yielded different results.  
A limitation concerning the data collection for Study 3 is that some of the PGs 
were tested in office rooms at treatment clinics and not in the laboratory. It would have 
been ideal to test all participants under identical conditions, but this was not practically 
possible. The office rooms had a similar set-up and were quiet and heated to normal 
office temperature, therefore conditions were similar albeit not identical. Finally, the 
three studies did not use longitudinal methodology, but were more akin to cross-
sectional research. Therefore it was not possible to determine directionality or 
causality. 
4.3 Conclusion 
This thesis reports the results from three studies that investigated the relationship 
between conditioning and gambling. Study 1 used a student sample and found that the 
participants who did not show aversive conditioning showed less risk-avoidance on a 
gambling task compared to the participants who showed aversive conditioning. In 
addition, Study 1 found no differences between the two groups on behavioural 
activation and behavioural inhibition. Study 2 also used a student sample, and found 
that participants that did not show appetitive or aversive conditioning on an evaluative 
conditioning paradigm showed less risk-taking on a simulated slot machine. In 
addition, Study 2 found an interaction effect between the FFFS and BAS-RR on risk-
taking, where the participants with low scores on both scales showed less risk-taking. 
Study 3 compared a PG group with a control group on results of an aversive 
conditioning paradigm. The results showed that whilst the control group showed 
aversive conditioning, the PG group did not show conditioning. The results from these 
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three studies contribute to the extant literature by suggesting that conditionability plays 
a role in gambling behaviour and PG. The results also suggest that BIS and BAS may 
play a role in gambling behaviour. The processes of classical and instrumental 
conditioning are included as important in the development of gambling behaviour and 
PG. This thesis suggests that the effects of the processes of classical and instrumental 
conditioning for gambling behaviour are contingent on individuals’ conditionability 
and reinforcement sensitivity.  
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